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I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1991 Report of the Secretary-General, Javier P6rez de
Cu6llar, speaking in regard to humanitarian intervention, stated,
"what is involved is not the right of intervention but the collective
obligation of States to bring relief and redress in human rights
emergencies." 1 New developments in international law support
acknowledgment of an emerging right of humanitarian assistance to
restore democracy. In this contemporary context, the United Nations
is the appropriate body to assert this right. A recent example of the
development in this area is the case of Haiti. On September 19,1994,
a U.S.-led multinational force was introduced into Haiti. U.N.
Security Council Resolution 940 authorized this force in order to eject
the military dictatorship from power, return Jean-Bertrande Aristide
to power, and maintain a stable and secure environment.
This Article argues that the overthrow of a democratic government can constitute a threat to peace and security under Article 39 of
the U.N. Charter,3 and that evidence of an emerging right of
humanitarian assistance to restore democracy is supported by recent
pronouncements in documents, declarations and resolutions of the
U.N. and of regional organizations, statements of government officials
t Portions of the research on which this paper is based were presented by the author at
the Seventh Annual Meeting of the Academic Council of the United Nations at The Hague on
June 23-24, 1994.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Detroit Mercy School of Law,B.A. 1977,
Rice University; J.D. 1980, University of Texas; LLM. 1989, University of Virginia.
1. Javier Pdrez de Cular, Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the
Organization,45 U.N.Y.B. 3, 8 (1991), U.N. Doc. A/46/404.
2. For details of Aristide's election and the coup that displaced him, see discussion infra
part V.C.1.
3. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
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and international law theorists, and statements in national policy
documents.4 Humanitarian assistance to restore democracy consists
largely of the support of democracy by measures not involving use of
force such as condemnation, withdrawal of aid, and suspension of
diplomatic relations or perhaps, if the exigency of the circumstances
demand, harsher measures such as economic sanctions. Use of force
as a form of humanitarian assistance to restore democracy is
advocated only when circumstances constitute a humanitarian crisis
involving human rights atrocities.5
In the series of resolutions regarding Haiti, the Security Council
extended humanitarian intervention to include measures against the
usurpation of the sovereign prerogative of a population to be
governed by those it has democratically elected. This placed the
international community at a crossroads in the development of a right
of humanitarian assistance. The right of humanitarian assistance to
restore democracy is supported by and, in turn, supports the emerging
concepts of an emerging right to democratic government,6 the right
of a population to be free from internal as well as external aggression,7 and the right of victims of human rights violations to receive
assistance.8 Since these rights support a concept of humanitarian
assistance which is more expansive than a right to assist democratic
restoration, it can be argued that a right to assist democratic
restoration is only the core of a much broader right of humanitarian
assistance

4. In this Article, the terms "humanitarian assistance" and "humanitarian intervention"
include measures undertaken without the consent of those in effective control of the state to halt
unacceptable killing, suffering or usurpation of rights of a population and refer to a span of
measures not involving force, such as economic sanctions, as well as, in the last resort and under
circumstances of egregious human rights violations, measures involving force. The term
"humanitarian assistance" is preferable in that it indicates that the purpose of measures is to
assist the population experiencing a humanitarian crisis.
5. For example, the overthrow and suppression of democracy by violent means could
present approrpiate circumstances for the use of force. This is consistent with the requirement
of proportionality discussed infra note 231 and accompanying text.
6. See Thomas Franck, Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46
(1992)
7. See W. Michael Reisman, Comment: Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary
InternationalLaw, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 866 (1990); Anthony D'Amato, The Invasion of Panama
Was a Lawful Response to Tyranny, 84 AM. J. INT'L L.516 (1990).
8. See Summing Up, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROLE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL:
PEACE KEEPING AND PEACE BUILDING 327,330 (Ren6-Jean Dupuy ed., 1993) (comment of H.
Thierry) [hereinafter Summing Up].
9. This possibility is discussed by Thomas Franck and Michael Reisman. Franck, supra
note 6; Reisman, supra note 7, at 866; see also D'Amato, supra note 7; Notes from Professor

1995]

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO RESTORE DEMOCRACY

331

Determing the limits of the right of humanitarian assistance
depends largely on the political will and desires of the international
community. For example, on September 26, 1994, President Clinton
addressed the General Assembly of the United Nations on efforts to
restore democracy:
In my nation, as in all of your nations, there are many people who
are understandably reluctant to undertake these efforts because
often the distances are great or the cultures are different. There
are good reasons for the caution that people feel.. Often the
chances of success, or the costs, are unclear. And, of course, in
every common endeavor there is always the potential for failure,
and often the risk of loss of life.'0
Several arguments support the right of humanitarian assistance
in regard to Haiti. First, there is emerging a right to assist the
restoration of democracy when there is violent overthrow or obstruction of a legitimate democratic government." Second, the violent
overthrow or obstruction of legitimate democracy constitutes a sufficient legal basis for the finding of a threat to the peace necessary for
the Security Council to adopt enforcement measures under Chapter
VII of the U.N. Charter. Third, the crisis in Haiti presents a clear cut
case of the violent overthrow and obstruction of legitimate democracy. Finally, the new concept of the right of humanitarian assistance
to restore democracy supports a unilateral right of humanitarian
intervention under limited circumstances where the United Nations
recognizes a legitimate need for action but is prevented from or is
unable to address the crisis.

Joseph Rees, VDM, Visiting Professor, International Law Day Conference (Oct. 29-30, 1994).
10. Wolf Blitzer, Clinton Will Announce Lifting of HaitiSanctions, Cable News Networc,
Sept. 26, 1994, Text of President Clinton's United Nations Address, availablein LEXIS, News
Library, CNN File.
11. Varying degrees of democracy can characterize the governmental process. In this
Article, "legitimate democracy" refers to a democratic government which is brought to power
by the democratic elements consistently set forth in human rights treaties, which elements have
been verified whether by U.N. monitoring, by an established tradition of participatory
democracy or other acceptable method. Regarding a "free and fair" election as a democratic
element, examine the criteria of Gregory fox. Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political
Participationin InternationalLaw, 86 AM. S. INT'L L. 249,251 (1992) [hereinafter Fox, Political
Participation,American Society]. Note free and fair elections are not the equivalent of
democracy, but a significant component. Id. at 249; see also Douglas Lee Donoho, The Role of
Human Rights In Global Security Issues: A Normative and Institutional Critique, 14 MICE. J.
INT'L L. 827, 841 (1993).
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II.

THE EMERGING RIGHT TO DEMOCRACY

Commentators note the right to democracy developing within
international agreements. Thomas Franck finds that democracy,
"while not yet fully word made law, is rapidly becoming in our time,
a normative rule of the international system."' 2 Gregory Fox asserts
that "parties to the major human rights conventions have created an
international law of participatory rights."' 3 The principle of democracy and the rights which together constitute the democratic prerogative are "guar~nteed in all comprehensive human rights instruments."' 4 Among these instruments are the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. The Universal Declaration states: "The will of the
people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall
be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by
equivalent free voting procedures."'" The International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights provide that: "All peoples have the right
of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine
their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social, and
' 6
cultural development."'
Thomas Franck argues that these documents together with
regional instruments constitute "a net of participatory entitlements."" In addition, the Charter of the Organization of American States
(OAS) declares that "representative democracy is an indispensable
condition for the stability, peace and development of the region" and
that promoting democracy is "an essential purpose of the OAS."' 18

12. Franck, supra note 6, at 46.
13. Gregory H. Fox, The Right To PoliticalParticipationin InternationalLaw, 17 YALE J.
INT'L L. 539, 607 (1992) [hereinafter Fox, PoliticalParticipation,Yale].
14. Fox, PoliticalParticipation,American Society, supranote 11, at 249. See also Franck,
supra note 6, at 46; Fox, PoliticalParticipation,Yale, supranote 13, at 539.
15. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d. Sess.,
at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1984).
16. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art.
1, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19,1966, art. 1, 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
17. Franck, supra note 6, at 79.
18. Organization of American States: Integrated Text of the Charter As Amended By the
Protocols of Buenos Aires and Cartegena De Indias; The Protocol of Amendment of
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The rights set forth in the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man (American Declaration) approximate those of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 9 The American Declaration sets forth rights and duties which are viewed by the General
Assembly of the OAS as international commitmentse and as
specifying the fundamental human rights addressed in the Charter of
the OAS.2 The American Declaration states in article XX: "Every
person having legal capacity is entitled to participate in the government of his country, directly or through his representatives, and to
take part in popular elections, which shall be by secret ballot, and
shall be honest, periodic and free."'
The American Convention on Human Rights, adopted on
November 22, 1969, states that "every citizen shall enjoy the...
[right] ...[t]o vote and to be elected in genuine periodic elections,
which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and by secret ballot
that guarantees the free expression of the will of the voter. . .."23
Regional instruments of the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe (CSCE) constitute, in Frank's words, "an unprecedented
North Atlantic and Europe-wide initiative to endorse and define a
popular right of electoral democracy."'2
Importantly, in addition to guaranteeing democratic freedoms to
the individual, recent instruments view democracy as both a keystone
of human rights and a necessary condition for international peace and
security. Reflecting the proliferation of democracies throughout the
1980s and 1990s, the Document of Copenhagen commits participating
states to the individual freedoms of democracy, including free
elections, representative government, government compliance with

Washington, and the Protocol of Amendment of Managua, Preamble and art. 20 [Done at
Bogota, in 1948, as amended in 1967 and 1985; Dec. 14, 1992; June 10, 1993] reprinted in 33
I.L.M. 981,989 [hereinafter OAS Charter]. The OAS Charter, adopted in 1948 and entered into
force on December 13, 1951, has been ratified by 32 states. Heidi V. Jimenez, Introductory
Note, OAS Charter, 33 I.L.M. 981 (1994).
19. FREDERiCL. KRGIS, JR., INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR LEGAL SETIING
978 (2nd ed. 1993).
20. Id. at 979.

21. Id. at 980.
22. The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, May 2, 1948, art. 27,
O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser.IV/II.23/Doc. 21/Rev. 6, at 18 (1988).
23. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22,1969, art. 23,1144 U.N.T.S. 144,151;
Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA\SER. L.V\II
71, Doc. 6 Rev. 1, at 25 (1988), Part I, art.23.
24. Thomas Buergenthal, The CopenhagenCSCE Meeting. A New Public Orderfor Europe,
11 HUM. RTS. L.J. 217, 221-222 (1990); see also Franck, supra note 6, at 67.
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law, and separation between the State and political parties.25 It
holds: "The participating states reaffirm that democracy is an inherent
element of the rule of law."6 The thirty-five participating states
"recognize that pluralistic democracy and the rule of law are essential
for ensuring respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms,
the development of human contacts and the resolution of other issues
of a related humanitarian character."'2 7 Further,
participating States express their conviction that full respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms and the development of
societies based on pluralistic democracy and the rule of law are
prerequisites for progress in setting up the lasting order of peace,
security4justice and co-operation that they seek to establish in
Europe.

The CSCE's Charter of Paris pledges to "undertake to build,
consolidate, and strengthen democracy as the only system of government of our nations."2 9 In addition to guaranteeing democratic
freedoms to every individual, the thirty-four participating states
proclaimed: "Democracy is the best safeguard of freedom of
expression, tolerance of all groups of society, and equality of

25. See Franck, supra note 6, at 67.
26. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Document of the Copenhagen
Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension, 29 I.L.M. 1305 (1990) [hereinafter
Copenhagen Document].
The Copenhagen-meeting convened in Copenhagen from June 25 to June 29,1990, and was
attended by representatives of one observer nation, Albania and the following 35 participating
states of the CSCE: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark,
Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece,
the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the United States of
America and Yugoslavia. Id. at 1306.
The Document of Copenhagen includes among essential elements of justice: (1) "free
elections," (2) "accountable ...representative" government, (3) a government, administration,
and judiciary regulated by law, (4) "independence of judges and the impartial operation of the
public judicial service," (5) military forces and police which are "under the control of, and
accountable to, the civil authorities," and (6) "legislation and regulations which are published."
Id. at 1308.
27. Id. at 1307.
28. Id.
29. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Charter of Paris for a New Europe
and Supplementary Document to Give Effect to Certain Provisions of the Charter (Done at
Paris, Nov. 21, 1990), 30 I.L.M. 190 (1991)[hereinafter Charter of Paris]. Leaders of thirty-four
participating states of the CSCE convened in Paris and adopted the Charter of Paris on Nov.
21, 1990 to initiate "a new era of democracy, peace and unity." Id. at 190.
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opportunity for each person."3 Participating states "are convinced
that in order to strengthen peace and security among our States, the
advancement of democracy, and respect for and effective exercise of
31
human rights, are indispensable.",
In the Moscow meeting of the CSCE, participating states asserted
that "full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the
development of societies based on pluralistic democracy and the rule
of law are prerequisites for a lasting order of peace, security, justice
and co-operation in Europe., 32 Participating states found that
"issues relating to human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy
and the rule of law are of international concern, as respect for these
rights and freedoms constitutes one of the foundations of the
international order."'3 3
Recent international conferences have mirrored the CSCE's
concerns. For instance, the Vienna Declaration of the U.N. World
Conference on Human Rights "considers the denial of the right of
self-determination as a violation of human rights and underlines the
importance of the effective realization of this right."3 The participating states expressly defined self-determination to include a
democratic entitlement, noting that it is through self-determination

30. Id. at 194.
31. Id. at 196.
32. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Document of the Moscow Meeting
on the Human Dimension Emphasizing Respect ForHuman Rights, PluralisticDemocracy, The
Rule of Law, and Proceduresfor Fact-Finding(Done at Moscow, Oct. 3, 1991), 30 I.L.M. 1670,
1672 (1991) [hereinafter Moscow Document]. The Moscow Meeting convened in Moscow from
September 10 to October 4, 1991 and was attended by representatives of the following
participating states of the CSCE: Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, the
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, the
Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta,
Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, the USSR, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and
Yugoslavia. Id. at 1671.
33. Id. at 1672.
34. United Nations World Conference on Human Rights: Vienna Declaration and Program
of Action, 32 I.L.M. 1661,1665 (1993) [hereinafter Vienna Declaration]. The World Conference
on Human Rights was assembled in Vienna by the United Nations on June 14-25, 1993.
Representatives of 171 States attended. The Vienna Declaration was adopted by acclamation
on June 25, 1993. Id. at 1661. The Vienna Declaration states that the focus of "[c]ooperation,
development and strengthening of human rights" should be on "strengthening and building of
institutions relating to human rights, strengthening of a pluralistic civil society and the protection
of groups which have been rendered vulnerable." To this end, assistance is necessary for "the
conduct of free and fair elections.... the strengthening of the rule of law, the promotion of
freedom of expression and the administration of justice, and ... the real and effective
participation of the people in the decision-making processes." Id. at 1683.

336

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 5:329

that peoples "freely determine their political status, and freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development."35 The Vienna
Declaration further affirmed that the "World Conference on Human
Rights considers the denial of the right of self-determination as a
violation of human rights and underlines the importance of the
effective realization of this right., 36 The participating states asserted
that "[d]emocracy, development and respect for human rights, and
fundamental freedoms are interdependent and mutually reinforcing."
Finally, the participating states agreed that "[d]emocracy is based on
the freely expressed will of the people to determine their own
political, economic, social and cultural
systems and their full participa37
tion in all aspects of their lives.,
These documents together with the U.N. monitoring of elections
have clarified the substantive meaning of the emerging right to
democracy.38 Gregory Fox lists criteria gathered from human rights
instruments and U.N. practice in monitoring elections that "defin[e]
39
a free and fair election.,

35. Id. at 1665.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1666.
38. Fox, PoliticalParticipation,American Society, supranote 11 at 250-253. See generally
Franck, supra note 6. U.N. monitoring of the elections can involve, as in the case of the U.N.
Observer Group for the Verification of the Elections in Haiti (ONUVEH), verification of the
use of secret ballots, public polling places, and voter registration. See Haiti Holds Free,
DemocraticElections with UN Help, U.N. CHRON., March, 1991, at 62. ONUVEH claimed that
"[iln a country that had been traumatized by the experience of the election on 29 November
1987, the first task of ONUVEH was to help create a psychological climate conducive to the
holding of democratic elections." Id. at 64.
39. These include:
1. periodic elections at reasonable intervals;
2. a secret ballot;
3. honesty in vote tabulation;
4. universal suffrage, with minor exceptions permitted for minors, prisoners, the
mentally ill, and the like;
5. an absence of discrimination against voters and candidates;
6. freedom to organize and join political parties, which must be given equal access to
the ballot, and an equal opportunity to campaign;
7. to the extent the government controls the media, the right of all parties to present
their views through the major media outlets;
8. supervision of the election by an independent council or commission not tied to any
party, faction, or individual, whose impartiality is insured in both law and practice.
Fox, Political Participation,American Society, supra note 11, at 251.
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Recent policy trends of actors in the world community have
further encouraged democracy as a right.' The United Nations has
monitored over thirty elections, including those in Namibia, Nicaragua, and Haiti.4 ' Several Western European nations have attempted
to withhold aid from those nations that are not democracies. On a
regional level, the European Community and the United States have
imposed on countries, such as the former Yugoslavia and the Balkan
States, "conditions on recognition" that include a commitment to
democratic governance.42
The idea of democracy is supported by fundamental instruments
of multilateralism, specifically the U.N. Charter. Under Chapter I,
article 1(2), "[t]he Purposes of the United Nations are .. . [t]o
develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples .... "'
Thomas Franck finds that the right of self-determination at present
"entitles peoples in all states to free, fair, and open participation in
the democratic process of governments freely chosen by each
state."'
He argues that interaction on the international level is
increasingly based on respect for democracy.45 In defining the right
of self-determination, Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr. ties the legitimacy of selfdetermination claims to "the degree of representative government in
the state."'
Hurst Hannum finds that "the present content of
40. Id.at 250-52; Bartram Brown, The Protectionof Human Rights In DisintegratingStates:
A New Challenge, 68 CHI-KENT L. REV. 203, 206 (1992); Marc Weller, The International
Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia, 86 AM. J. INT'L. L
569, 574-577 (1992); Thomas Franck, Intervention Against Illegitimate Regimes, in LAW AND
FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL WORLD ORDER 177 (Lori Fisler Damrosh et al. eds.,
1992).
41. Fox, PoliticalParticipation,Yale, supra note 13, at 541.
42. Fox, PoliticalParticipation,American Society, supra note 11, at 250.
43. U.N. CHARTER art. I, 2. (emphasis added).
44. Franck, supranote 6, at 59.
The Vienna Declaration states: "All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue
of that right they freely determine their political status, and freely pursue their economic, social
and cultural development." Vienna Declaration, supra note 34, at 1665. A people may even
chose to reject democratic government as long as that choice is made freely and fairly. As
Thomas Carothers explains, "[i]f our stated principle is to respect the consent and will of the
people, we will find ourselves in the difficult situation of having to accept the fact that
nondemocratic governments are at times the choice of the people." Thomas Carothers,
Empirical Perspectives on the Emerging Norm Of Democracy in InternationalLaw, 86 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 261, 265 (1992).
45. See generally, Franck, supra note 6.
46. Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Comment: The Degrees of Self-Determination in the United
Nations Era, 88 AM. J.INT'L L. 304, 308 (1994). However, Kirgis includes the right to
democracy in the group of elements which make up self-determination which cannot be

338

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 5:329

international human rights law does include the great majority of what
Woodrow Wilson and others viewed as the internal content of selfdetermination- democracy."'47
Support of democracy has become increasingly identified with the
maintenance of peace and security.' Resolution 917 declared that
the obstruction of the restoration of democracy in Haiti constituted
a threat to peace.4 9 By imposing sanctions and authorizing military
intervention in order to restore democratic rule in Haiti, the Security
Council further recognized democracy as an entitlement. The
Security Council corroborated the claim of a population's right to be
governed by those whom they had elected freely, fairly and openly.
III. THE CONCEPT OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY
The concept of popular sovereignty is at the heart of the
emerging right to restore democracy. Michael Reisman notes that
"sovereignty can be violated as effectively and ruthlessly by an
indigenous as by an outside force, in much the same way that the
wealth and natural resources of a country can be spoliated as
thoroughly and efficiently by a native as by a foreigner."50
Seen in this manner, the sovereignty of Haiti was violated when
the will of the people, ascertained in open, free and fair elections, was
thwarted by violent means. Reisman also argues that the right of selfdetermination signals "a radical decision that henceforth the internal
'1l
authority of governments would be appraised internationally.
Further, the appearance of "criteria for appraising the conformity of
internal governance with international standards
of democracy" is
2
sovereignty.
popular
of
rise
the
of
evidence

"categorically" considered an established rule of international law. Id.
47. Hurst Hannum, RethinkingSelf-Determination, 34 VA. J.INT'L L. 1,59(1993). Hannum
states: "Both the right of a people organized as a state to freedom from external domination and
the right of the people of a state to a government that reflects their wishes are essential
components of the right of self-determination." Id. at 33.
48. Nancy D. Arnison, InternationalLaw and Non-Intervention: When Do Humanitarian
Concerns Supersede Sovereignty? 17 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 199 (1993).
49. S.C. Res. 917, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3376th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/917 (1994); see
also Arnison, supra note 48; Goodrich, Hambro and Simons assert that the priorities accorded
the purposes of the Charter are determinative of the types of problems addressed by the United
Nations currently and the remedies adopted to solve them. GOODRICH, ET AL, THE CHARTER
OF THE UNITED NATIONS 25 (3rd ed., 1969).

50. Reisman, supra note 7, at 872.
51. Id. at 867.

52. Id. at 868.
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The emerging right of humanitarian assistance to restore
democracy is affiliated with the right of self-determination. On the
adoption of Resolution 940, U.S. Representative to the United
Nations Madeleine K. Albright stated that the resolution's objective
was "not to impinge upon the sovereignty of Haiti, but to restore the
power to exercise that sovereignty to those who rightfully possessed
it and to enable Haiti, in the words of the United Nations Charter, to
pursue5 3'social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom."'
Restoration of democracy and the right of self-determination has
figured prominently in the lawfulness of recent military action in the
southern hemisphere. On October 27, 1993, the governor-general of
Grenada, Sir Paul Scoon, requested assistance from the United
Kingdom, the United States, Jamaica and the Organization of Eastern
Caribbean States. In addition, a written request addressed to Prime
Minister John Adams stated: "It is my desire that a peace-keeping
force should be established in Grenada to facilitate a rapid return to
peace and tranquility and also a return to democratic rule."'54
Professor John Norton Moore describes the Grenada mission as
"regional peacekeeping assistance for the purpose of both restoring
self-determination on Grenada and ending the chaos and vacuum of
authority threatening human rights and bloodshed". 5
Former President Bush, in setting forth the objectives of the
mission in Panama in 1990, stated: "On Wednesday, December 20th,
I ordered U.S. troops to Panama with four objectives: to safeguard
the lives of American citizens; to help restore democracy; to protect
the integrity of the Panama Canal treaties; and to bring General
Manuel Noriega to justice."56 Professor Anthony D'Amato grounds
the lawfulness of the military action in Panama under the device of
a right to popular sovereignty. D'Amato argues that "human rights

53. Statement of Madeleine K. Albright, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Addressing the
U.N. Security Council (July 30,1994), in Security Council Authorizes MultinationalForce 'To

Use All Necessary Means' To FacilitateDepartureof Military From Hait, Return of President
Aristide, Federal News Service (Aug. 1, 1994), availablein LEXIS, NEWS Library, FEDNEW
File [hereinafter Security Council Authorizes MultinationalForce].

54. Letter from Governor-General Scoon, of Grenada, to Prime Minister John Adams, of
Barbados (October 24, 1983), quoted in John Norton Moore, Grenada and the International
Double Standard,78 AM. J. INT'L L. 145, 148 (1984).

55. Id. at 148.
56. President George Bush, Announcement on Noriega's Arrest (Jan. 3, 1990), in The
Reuter Library Report (Jan. 3, 1990) (emphasis added).

340

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 5:329

law demands intervention against tyranny."'57 Although D'Amato
does not argue for restoration of democracy as a form of government,
he does "regard 'tyranny' as occurring when those who have
monopolistic control of the weapons and instruments of suppression
in a country turn those weapons and instruments against their own
people" and finds "that intervention from outside is not only legally
justified .but morally required."58
IV. THE RIGHT OF THE VICTIM TO RECEIVE ASSISTANCE
The expression, "humanitarian assistance," is a more descriptive
term than "humanitarian intervention."59 It is on the right of a
victim to receive assistance that the right to give assistance is based. 60
Jurisprudentially, the case of Nicaragua v. United States laid the
groundwork for this right of assistance. The International Court of
Justice made clear that giving humanitarian aid is not an unlawful
intervention when it stated categorically, "[t]here can be no doubt
that the provision of strictly humanitarian aid to persons or forces in
another country, whatever their political affiliations or objectives,
cannot be regarded as unlawful61 intervention, or as in any other way
contrary to international law.",

57. D'Amato, supra note 7, at 519.
58. Id.
59. A. Truyol Y. Serra states, "the right we are discussing here should be called the right
of humanitarianassistance rather than the right of interference or intervention, which are not
neutral expressions." Summing Up, supranote 8, at 327 (comment of A. Truyol Y. Serra). J.P.
Puissochet states, "it is true that the expression right or duty of interference - which was the
subject of a workshop in Fiance in 1987 - should be abandoned in favor of the right of
humanitarian assistance, which is a more appropriate concept." Id. at 327 (comment of J.-P.
Puissochet). However, Thierry states that he prefers the expression, "duty to interfere because it stresses that the rights of the victims prevail over the preservation of state
sovereignty." Id. at 330 (comment of H. Thierry).
60. Id. (comment of M. Torrelli discussing the comments of H. Thierry). Torrelli agrees
with Thierry and states, "there is a right of assistance based to a certain extent on every victim's
right to assistance." Id. Legally speaking, however, the right of assistance prevails over the right
to assistance. As Mr. Salcedo states, "[v]ictims do indeed have a right to assistance, in the same
way as a State has the duty to guarantee its citizens fundamental rights and liberties." Id.
(comment of J. A. Carillo Salcedo); see David J. Scheffer, Toward a Modem Doctrine of
HumanitarianIntervention 23 U. ToL- L. REV. 253 (1992).
61. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 1 242 (June 27),
quoted in Mary Ellen O'Connell, Continuing Limits on U.N. Intervention in Civil War 67 IND.
L. J. 903, 906 (1992). O'Connell interprets the Nicaragua case as allowing "[d]istribution of
humanitarian aid, even against the wishes of a government in effective control .... " Id.

19951

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO RESTORE DEMOCRACY

341

Security Council resolutions addressing human rights violations
in Iraq, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia and Rwanda confirm a right to
assist victims of human rights abuses. Resolution 688 condemned
"the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq,
including most recently in Kurdish-populated areas.. ." and appealed
"to all Member Sates and to all humanitarian organizations to contribute to... humanitarian relief efforts." 62 The resolutions addressing
the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina have been humanitarian in purpose
in providing food, water, and shelter to victims, and condemning
genocide and other atrocities.6
In Resolution 794, the Security
Council found that the "magnitude of the human tragedy caused by
the conflict in Somalia" constituted a threat to peace and accepted the
United States' offer to deploy its military under U.S. control to
protect the distribution of humanitarian aid.' In Resolution 918
regarding Rwanda, the Security Council sought to "secure humanitarian areas," and to protect "distribution of relief supplies and
humanitarian relief operations."'
The right to give assistance includes a continuum of action of

varying degrees of intrusion with military intervention at one extreme
and mere condemnation at the other. If humanitarian assistance takes
the form of military intervention, the use of force is required to be

62. S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982nd mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/688 (1991).
63. See generally S.C. Res. 770, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3106th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES770
(1992) (calling upon States to take "all measures necessary to facilitate . . . delivery of
humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and wherever needed in Bosnia and Herzegovina"); S.C.
Res. 743, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3055th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES1743 (1992) (establishing
UNPROFOR, a U.N. Protective Force); S.C. Res. 761, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3078th mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES761 (1992) (authorizing UNPROFOR to secure the Sarajevo airport to secure
delivery of humanitarian aid); S.C. Res. 776, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3114th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/REs1776 (1992) (enlarging UNPROFOR's mandate to further protect the delivery of aid);
S.C.. Res. 781, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3122nd mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES781 (1992) (establishing
a ban on military flights in the airspace of Bosnia-Herzegovina); S.C. Res. 819, U.N. SCOR, 48th
Sess., 3199th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/819 (1993) (demanding the "unimpeded delivery of
humanitarian assistance to all parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina"); S.C. Res. 824, U.N. SCOR,
48th Sess., 3208th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/824 (1993) (establishing Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa,
Gorazde, Bihac, and Srebenica as safe areas).
64. S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (1992).
65. S.C. Res. 918, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3377th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/918 (1994).
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necessary and proportional.' Possible abuses of the right to give
humanitarian assistance remain a concem.67
The "right of assistance" acknowledges a moral imperative to
come to the aid of the suffering that, arguably, can raise the right of
assistance to a duty of assistance. J. A. Carrillo Salcedo asserts that
"if there is a clear and far-reaching violation of fundamental human
rights, the international community has the duty to interfere, via the
United Nations Security Council or General Assembly . . .,,"
Former Secretary-General P6rez de Cu~llar notes a duty or obligation
of assistance rather than a right as well when he finds a "collective
obligation of States to bring relief and redress in human rights
emergencies."69
The often-voiced requirement that aid be given indiscriminately
supports an obligation of assistance. ° For instance, SecretaryGeneral P6rez de Cu6llar sets forth the first caveat to the principle of
protection of human rights, which can be referred to as the principle
of impartiality: that protection "cannot be invoked in a particular
situation and disregarded in a similar one. To apply it selectively is
to debase it."'" Under General Assembly Resolution 47/120, the

66. See P6rez de Cu6llar, supranote 1, at 8 (explaining that proportionality is required to
be maintained during an intervention). "Proportionality is a fundamental component of the law
on the use of force and the law of armed conflict-the jus ad bellum and the jus ad belle ....
The legitimate resort to force under the United Nations system is regarded by most
commentators as restricted to the use of force in self-defense under Article 51 and collective
security action under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter." Judith Gail Gardam, Proportionality
and Force in InternationalLaw, 87 AM. J.INT'L L. 391, 391 (1993). "In the jus ad bello sense,
proportionality has 'to do with calculations of force necessary to subdue the enemy .... ."' id.
(quoting JAMES TURNER JOHNSON, JUST WAR TRADIION AND THE RESTRAINT OF WAR 202
(1991)).
67. B. Godet notes that "the right of humanitarian assistance can be exercised only in
favour of or against 'small States,' there being no possibility of action against the great Powers."
Summing Up, supra note 8, at 328 (comment of B. Godet). F. Orrego Vicuna states that "the
difficulty, or indeed the danger, lies in the fact that some people wanted to extend the possibility
of intervention to other situations that are different from that of the Kurds: for example,
intervention for ecological purposes." Id. at 329 (comment of F. Orrego Vicuna).
68. Id.at 331 (comment of J. A. Carrillo Salcedo).
69. Pdrez de Cu6llar, supra note 1, at 8 (emphasis added); see also Scheffer, supranote 60,
at 263.
70. See Summing Up, supra note 8, at 327-34.
71. P6rez de Cu6llar, supra note 1, at 8. As B. Godet states, "[p]olitical and humanitarian
matters do not make good bedfellows. Indeed, humanitarian matters are becoming more and
more political . . . ." Summing Up, supra note 8, at 328; see also David J. Scheffer, The
Expanding U.N. Role In HumanitarianRelief Operations,86 A.S.I.L. PROCEEDINGS 313, 317
(1992) (discussing the rapid evolvement of the legal norms underpinning international
humanitarian relief operations).
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secretary-general is encouraged "to continue to address the question
of coordination, when necessary, between humanitarian assistance
programmes and peace-keeping or related operations, preserving the
non-political, neutral, and impartial characterof humanitarianaction
1172

Further, the principle of impartiality argues for a recognition of
a right to assist the restoration of democracy, just as a right exists to
assist the victims of violations of other recognized freedoms 3 After
all, "[r]espect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms without
distinction of any kind is a fundamental rule of international human
rights law."'74 Arguably, former Secretary-General P6rez de Cu61lar
includes aggression against the sovereign will of the people when he
speaks of "human rights emergencies" which trigger an obligation to
assist. 75 Tyranny is an injury different in kind from deprivation of
food, water, and shelter, yet the right to be free from domination is
vital.
V. DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO ASSIST TO RESTORE DEMOCRACY
A. Evidence of the Emerging Right of Humanitarian Assistance to
Restore Democracy
The emerging right to assist to restore democracy appears to be
a step taken in the development of humanitarian assistance and is a
part of the overall development of humanitarian assistance. A
discussion of the recent evidence of developments in the right to assist

72. An Agenda for Peacepreventivediplomacy and relatedmatters, G.A. Res. 47/120, at 41
(1992), reprinted in 46 U.N.Y.B. 38, U.N. Sales No. E.93.I.l. (emphasis added). The claim of
a right or duty of assistance was central to the U.N. undertaking in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In
Resolution 770, the Security Council expressly acted under Chapter VII and found "that the
situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina constitutes a threat to international peace and security and
that the provision of humanitarianassistancein Bosnia andHerzegovina is an importantelement
in the Council's effort to restore internationalpeace and security in the area.. . ." (emphasis
added). S.C. Res. 770, supra note 63.
73. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali insists that "the principles of the Charter must
be applied consistently, not selectively." An Agenda for Peace: preventive diplomacy,
peacemaking,and peace-keeping: Report of the Secretary-General,U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., at
975, U.N. Doc. A/47/277 (1992), reprinted in 46 U.N.Y.B. 35, U.N. Sales No. E.93.I.1. Other
recognized freedoms include the right of self-determination, and "freedom from torture,
disappearance.... prolonged arbitrary detention, [and] ... systematic racial discrimination."
Hannum, supra note 47, at 36; Hans A. Linde, Book Review, 85 Am. J. INT'L L. 414 (1991).
74. Vienna Declaration, supra note 34, 15, at 1667.
75. P~rez de Cufllar, supra note 1, at 7, 8.
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to protect human rights is consistent with and supports a right of
humanitarian assistance to restore democracy.
1. General Assembly Resolutions. Recent General Assembly
resolutions support a right of the international community to assist
victims in humanitarian crises. The General Assembly Resolution on
the High Commissioner for the Promotion and Protection of All
Human Rights "recogni[zes] that... the promotion and protection of
all human rights is a legitimate concern of the international community" and that "it is the duty of States... to promote and protect all
human rights and fundamental freedoms ....76
The Resolution on Strengthening the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance of the United Nations also supports a
right of humanitarian assistance. 7 This resolution provides that
"humanitarian assistance should be provided with the consent of the
affected country and in principle on the basis of an appeal by the affected country."' While such consent is preferable, when it is not
given, humanitarian intervention, including that involving the use of79
force, can be provided without the consent of the affected country.
2. The Vienna Declaration. The concept of the right of
humanitarian assistance to restore democracy, supported by Security
Council Resolution 940, is not new. It is consistent with the declarations in, as well as the tenor of numerous recent international and
regional instruments. The Vienna Declaration, adopted at the World
Conference on Human Rights, states that the right of humanitarian
assistance is justified on the grounds that: (1) "[t]he promotion and
protection of human rights is a matter of priority for the international
community; ' ' 80 (2) "[h]uman rights and fundamental freedoms are
the birthright of all human beings; their '8protection
and promotion is
the first responsibility of Governments;" 1 and (3) "the international

76. The General Assembly Resolution on the High Commissionerfor the Promotionand
ProtectionofAll Human Rights, G.A. Res. 48/141, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., 85th mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/48141 (1993), reprintedin 33 IL.M.303,305 (1994); see also Vienna Declaration, supra
note 34, at 1665.
77. See discussion of norm of intervention in KiRGIs, supra note 19, at 866-67.
78. Resolution on Strengthening the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance
of the United Nations, G.A. Res.46/182, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Annex 1 3, at
50, U.N. Doc. A/46/49 (1991), reprinted in KIRGIS, supra note 19, at 862-866 [hereinafter
Assistance Resolution].
79. Id.; Scheffer, supra note 71, at 314; KIRGIS, supranote 19, at 866-867.
80. Vienna Declaration, supra note 34, at 1665.
81. Id.

1995]

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO RESTORE DEMOCRACY

345

community should devise ways and means to remove the current
obstacles and meet challenges to the full realization of all human
rights and to prevent the continuation of human rights violations
resulting thereof throughout the world."'
The Vienna Declaration is also supportive of the emerging right
to assist to restore democracy. It bases this emerging right on the
grounds that: (1) by the right of self-determination, all peoples "freely
determine their political status, and freely pursue their economic,
social and cultural development;"' and (2) "[t]he denial of the right
of self-determination [is] a violation of human rights and underlines
the importance of the effective realization of this right."'
The
Vienna Declaration further states that:
[T]his shall not be construed as authorizing or encouraging any
action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the
territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent
states conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples and thus possessed
of a Government representing the whole people belonging to the
territory without distinction of any kind.s
Establishing the importance of the "effective realization" of the
right to self-determination, exhorting the international community to
prevent the continuation of human rights violations, and ruling out
action against representative governments would allow a right of
humanitarian assistance. This right could conceivably include military
intervention in states with non-representative governments which
violate fundamental human rights, including the right of self-determination. 6 The World Conference on Human Rights (World Conference) acted on a right of humanitarian assistance when it called "on
all States to take immediate measures, individually and collectively,
to combat the practice of ethnic cleansing to bring it quickly to an

82. Id.at 1664. In preparation for the U.N. World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna,
the Center for Human Rights submitted a draft which reportedly would have allowed "flexible,
prompt, corrective and preventive measures" to correct human rights abuses and further would
permit committees to present human rights abuses directly to the Security Council. Third World
nations voiced objections to these provisions. Human Rights: Third World Unhappy in Lead
With, Inter Press Service, Apr. 20, 1993.
83. Vienna Declaration, supra note 34, at 1665.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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end."87 The World Conference found not only a right of states to
assist to end genocide but also a right of victims to receive assistance.
It stated, "[v]ictims of the abhorrent practice of' 88ethnic cleansing are
entitled to appropriate and effective remedies."
3. CSCE Documents. The Copenhagen Document, the Charter
of Paris, and the Moscow Document, provide support for the victims
of violations of rights and fundamental freedoms to receive assistance
and the right of participating states to assist such victims. These
instruments which carried forward the Helsinki process89 have been
However,
described by some as "political" and "nonbinding."'
Professor Kirgis recognizes that significant human rights instruments
"reflect an opiniojuris" and states further that "[i]n the human rights
demonfield, a strong showing of opinio juris may overcome a weak
91
rule."
customary
a
establish
to
practice
state
of
stration
In the Copenhagen Document, each participating state makes a
commitment not only to defend and protect the democratic order
established within its own borders but also a commitment to defend
and protect the democratic order of the other participating states
against violent attack. According to the Copenhagen Document, the
participating states
recognize their responsibility to defend and protect, in accordance
with their laws, their international human rights obligations and
87. Id. at 1676.
88. Id. at 1677.
89. The "Helsinki process" is described as a systematic process by which nations develop,
encourage, build and maintain the law of "the legal structures for the enforcement of human
rights," i.e., economic, social and cultural rights. Lori Fisler Damrosch, ConstitutionalControl
of MilitaryActions:A ComparativeDimension, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 92,95 (1991). In 1972, thirtyfive nations, including the United States and the Soviet Union inaugurated this process by
meeting to discuss fundamental freedoms at the Conference of Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE). James F. Smith, NAFTA and Human Rights: A Necessary Linkage, 27 U.C.
DAvis L. RBv. 793, 819 & n.96 (1994).
90. See Lori Fishier Damrosch, InternationalHuman Rights Law in Soviet and American
Courts, 100 YALE LJ. 2315, 2319 (1991); Jost Delbruck, A More Effective InternationalLaw or
a New "World Law"?- Some Aspects of the Development of InternationalLaw in a Changing
InternationalSystem, 68 IND. LU. 705, 715 & n.39 (1993).
91. Kirgis, supra note 46, at 306. Kirgis makes this comment in discussing the Vienna
Declaration and General Assembly resolutions. Id. According to Hurst Hannum, the 1975 Final
Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (to which the Charter of Paris,
the Copenhagen Document and the Moscow Document are "follow-up" documents) represents
"a significant understanding between the Western and Soviet blocs on a variety of issues."
Hannum, supra note 47, at 28; butsee Damrosh, supra note 90. Damnrosh asserts that the CSCE
documents "are generally considered 'political' rather than 'legal.'" Id. at 2319.
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their international commitments, the democratic order freely
established through the will of the people against the activities of
persons, groups or organizations that engage in or refuse to
renounce terrorism or violence aimed at the overthrow of that
order or of that of anotherparticipatingState.92

Note that a reasonable interpretation of the language "defend and
protect" could include forcible intervention. The right of the
individual victim to both seek and give assistance in circumstances
where fundamental freedoms are violated is clearly set forth.93 This
right of assistance would reasonably include transboundary assistance.
Note that assistance is not limited to nonforcible methods.
In the Charter of Paris, participating states indicate that the
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms is undertaken
as a step necessary to strengthen democracy.94 Participating states
make a commitment to protect democratic government, asserting that
"[o]ur States will co-operate and support each other with the aim of
making democratic gains irreversible."'9 5 In support of the right of
democracy, the right of the victim to receive assistance from the
international community is set forth as follows:

92. Copenhagen Document, supra note 26, at 1309 (emphasis added).
93. The pertinent provisions state,
(11) The participating States further affirm that, where violations of human rights
and fundamental freedoms are alleged to have occurred, the effective remedies
available include
-the right of the individual to seek and receive adequate legal
(11.1)
assistance;
(11.2) -the right of the individual to seek and receive assistance from
others in defending human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to
assist others in defending human rights and fundamental freedoms;
-the right of individuals or groups acting on their behalf to commu(11.3)
nicate with international bodies with competence to receive and
consider information concerning allegations of human rights abuses.
Copenhagen Document, supra note 26, at 1312; see also Scheffer, supra note 60, at 276-77.
94.
We undertake to build, consolidate and strengthen democracy as the only system of
government of our nations. In this endeavor, we will abide by the following:
Human rights and fundamental freedoms are the birthright of all human
beings, are inalienable and are guaranteed by law. Their protection and
promotion is the first responsibility of government.
Charter of Paris, supra note 29, at 193.
95. Id. at 195.
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We will ensure that everyone will enjoy recourse to effective
remedies, national or international, against any violation of his
rights.
Full respect for these precepts96is the bedrock on which we will seek
to construct the new Europe.
In the Moscow Document, participating states make a commitment to support restoration of legitimate democracy as follows:
(17) The participating States
(17.1) - condemn unreservedly forces which seek to take
power from a representative government of a
participating State against the will of the people as
expressed in free and fair elections and contrary to
the justly established constitutional order;
(17.2) - will support vigorously, in accordance with the
Charterof the United Nations, in case of overthrow
or attempted overthrow of a legitimately elected
government of a participatingState by undemocratic
means, the legitimate organs of that State upholding
human rights, democracy and the rule of law, recognizing their common commitment to countering any
attempt to curb these basic values;
(17.3) - recognize the need to make further peaceful
efforts concerning human rights, democracy and the
rule of law within the context of security and cooperation in Europe, individually and collectively, to
make democratic advances irreversible and prevent
any falling below the standards laid down in the
principles and provisions of the Final Act, the
Vienna Concluding Document, the Document of the
Copenhagen Meeting, the Charter of Paris for a New
Europe and the present document. 97
4.

Organizationof American States Charterand Resolutions.

The Organization of American States (OAS) supports a right of
humanitarian assistance to restore democracy. The preamble of the
Charter of the Organization of American States declares that member
states are "convinced that representative democracy is an indispens-

96. Id.
97. Moscow Document, supra note 32, at 1677 (emphasis added); see Scheffer, supranote

60, at 278.
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able condition for the stability, peace and development of the
region."98 Article 2 of the OAS Charter sets forth as an "essential
purpose" the promotion and consolidation of "representative
democracy, with due respect for the principle of nonintervention." 99
Despite its acknowledgement of the principle of nonintervention, the
OAS has undertaken an activist role in support of democracy under
article 2.
The Santiago Resolution, adopted on June 5, 1991, asserts that
regional solidarity requires "the political organization of those
[American] States to be based on effective exercise of representative
democracy."'" The Santiago Resolution instructs
"the Secretary General to call for the immediate convocation of a
meeting of the Permanent Council in the case of any event giving
rise to the sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic
political institutional process of the legitimate exercise of power by
the democratically elected government in any of the Organization's
member states."' '°U

The Permanent Council shall "look into the events [and] ... adopt

any measures deemed appropriate."' "°2 In fact, as U.S. Senator
Graham indicated, "[m]uch of the original impetus for international
action in Haiti was as a result of the OAS's Santiago Resolution,
which10 3committed the hemisphere to the protection of democracies.'
The first convocation of the OAS Permanent Council under the
Santiago Resolution was the September 30, 1991, meeting of the
Permanent Council in response to the overthrow of President
Aristide. Permanent Council Resolution 567 adopted on September
30, 1991, condemned the "abrupt, violent, and irregular interruption
of the legitimate exercise of power by the democratic government of
that country" and demanded "adherence to the Constitution and
respect for the government, which was legitimately established

98. OAS Charter, supra note 18, at 989.
99. IL
100. O.A.S. G.A. Res. 1080, pmbl. (June 5, 1991), reprinted in 2 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE
DIsPATCH 750, 750 (Sept.-Dec. 1991).
101. ld. 1.
102. Id.12.

103. Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Coalition Defense
and Reinforcing Forces, Fed. News Service, May 12, 1994 (statement of Sen. Graham).
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10 4
through the free expression of the will of that country's people." '
Consistent with the concept of popular sovereignty, the Permanent
Council demanded that "parties put an end to the violation of the
Haitian people's rights, respect the life and physical safety of
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, and restore the President's exercise
of his constitutional authority."' 5
OAS Resolution MRE/RES 1/91, which called for the diplomatic,
economic and commercial isolation of Haiti, condemned "the grave
events taking place in Haiti, which deny the right of its people to selfdetermination, and [demands] full restoration of the rule of law and
of constitutional order and the immediate reinstatement of President
Jean-Bertrand Aristide in the exercise of his legitimate authority.""
OAS Resolution MRE/RES 2/91, which imposed a trade embargo on
Haiti, denounced the replacement of the legitimate president of
Haiti.
The OAS has called for the restoration or strengthening of
democracy in Peru and Venezuela as well. Under the Santiago
Resolution, the Permanent Council convened and adopted a resolution on April 6, 1992, which called for an ad hoc meeting of the
Ministers of Foreign Affairs regarding the denial of representative
democracy in Peru. By Resolution MRE/RES 2/92, the Ministers of
Foreign Affairs noted the commitment made by President Fujimori
to the people of Peru to "call immediate elections for a Constitutional
Congress, in an electoral process fully guaranteeing free expression of
the will of the people, in such a way as to restore representative
democracy in his country"'"° and urged Peruvian authorities to
restore representative democracy as early as possible." In addressing the attempted overthrow of the democratic government in
Venezuela, the General Assembly passed a resolution on May 22,
1992, confirming their support for the democratic government of

104. OAS Resolution MRE/RES. 567, 1 (Sept. 30, 1991), reprinted in 2 U.S. DEPT. OF
STATE DISPATcH 750,750 (Sept.-Dec., 1991).
105. Id. 3.
106. OAS Resolution MRE/RES. 1191, 1 (Oct. 3, 1991), reprinted in 2 U.S. DET. OF
STATE DISPATCH 760, 760 (Sept.-Dec., 1991).
107. OAS Resolution MRE/RES. 2191 (Oct. 8, 1991), reprintedin 2 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE
DISPATCH 761, 761 (Sept.-Dec., 1991).
108. OAS Resolution MRE/RES. 2/92, 1 (May 18, 1992), reprinted in 3 U.S. DEPT OF
STATE DISPATH 526, 526 (1992).
109. Id. 2.
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Venezuela and reaffirming "confidence in democracy, as the political
system of American nations ....
5. EuropeanUnionDeclaration. In condemning the installation
of Emile Jonassaint as president of Haiti and reaffirming its support
for sanctions, the European Union demonstrated its commitment to
the restoration of democracy in Haiti."' The European Union
noted that the installation of Jonassaint was an affront to the international community and stressed its support for measures adopted by
the Security Council and the OAS."
6. Clinton Administration Guidelines. In May, 1994, President
Clinton signed a presidential decision directive (PDD) after a review
of the United States' "peacekeeping policies and programs in order
to develop a comprehensive policy framework, suited to the realities
of the post-cold war period."'" The crisis in Haiti was one of the
first to be considered under the new policy." The summary of the
PDD lists factors for the administration to contemplate "when
deciding whether to vote for a proposed new U.N. peace operation
(Chapter VI or Chapter VII) or to support a regionally-sponsored
peace operation '' " in an effort to avoid missions which are broad,
indefinite, and open-ended or which do not advance U.S. interests." 6 The summary also seems to indicate support from the
Clinton administration for a right of humanitarian assistance in finding
a threat to the peace in "the sudden interruption of established
democracy or gross violation of human rights coupled with violence
or threat of violence."' ' 7

110. OAS General Assembly Resolution AG/doc.2906/92, 2 (May 22, 1992), reprintedin
3 DEPT. OF STATE DISPATCH 527, 527 (1992).

111. Press Communiqueby the Presidency on Behalfofthe European Union on Haiti,Reuter
European Community Report, May 30, 1994.
112. Id.
113. United States: Administration Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, May
1994, 33 I.L.M. 795, 798 [hereinafter PDD].

114. Madeleine Albright, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, indicated the U.S.
deployment in Rwanda was the "first test of the application of PDD-25." Farhan Haq, U.S.Peacekeeping: Washington Puts U.N. Missions On Hit List, Inter Press Service, May 18, 1994,
available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, WIRES File.

115. PDD, supra note 113, at 803.
116. Haq, supra note 114.
117. See PDD, supra note 114, at 802-03.
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B. Security Council's Claim of Secondary Rights in the Emergence
of the Right of Humanitarian Assistance to Restore Democracy
The right of humanitarian assistance certainly includes the right
to deliver food, water, and shelter,"' and this right, in turn, gives
rise to additional rights necessary to fulfill such an obligation."' In
the case of the right to give humanitarian assistance in the form of
food, water, and shelter, the secondary rights have come to include a

118. O'Connell, supra note 61, at 906.
119. See Scheffer, supranote 71 at 316-17; see also KIRGIS, supranote 19, at 867,875 (noting
U.N. demands that conditions allowing for the delivery of humanitarian assistance be created).
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right of delivery or access,"2 a right to protect victims,"' and a
right to protect U.N. personne-1.'
120. See Scheffer, supra note 74, at 317; see also KIRGIS, supra note 19, at 875-76. In the
context of Bosnia-Herzegovina, this concern was addressed by the Security Council in
Resolution 770, which stated that the provision of humanitarian assistance in BosniaHerzegovina is "an important element in the Council's effort to restore international peace and
security in the area .... S.C. Res. 770, supra note 63, and in Resolution 819, which stated the
Council's position that "impediments to the delivery of humanitarian assistance constitute a
serious violation of international humanitarian law ... ." S.C. Res. 819, supra note 63.
In the Somalian context, Resolution 794 "authorizefedjthe Secretary-General and Member
States... to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for
humanitarian relief operations in Somalia." S.C. Res. 794, supranote 64.
Comments made during the Security Council debate of December 3, 1992, support a
secondary right of delivery or access. Ambassador Merimee of France stated that "[t]he
commitment is part of the principle of establishing access to victims and of the right to emergency humanitarian assistance... ." Comment of Amb. Merimee of France, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess.,
3145th mtg. at 29, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3145 (1992) (emphasis added).
Addressing the Rwandan crisis, Security Council Resolution 918 expanded the United
Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda's (UNAMIR's) mandate to include protection of the
"distribution of relief supplies" and acknowledged that UNAMIR "may be required to take
action in self defense against persons or groups who threaten ... the means of delivery and
distribution of humanitarian relief." S.C. Res. 918, supra note 65.
121. In Resolution 743, the Security Council established under its authority, a U.N.
Protection Force (UNPROFOR). S.C. Res. 743, supra note 63. Secretary-General BoutrosGhali in a report to the Security Council described the UNPROFOR concept:
United Nations troops and police monitors would be deployed in certain areas in
Croatia, designated as "United Nations Protected Areas." These areas would be
demilitarized; all armed forces in them would be either be withdrawn or disbanded.
The role of the United Nations troops would be to ensure that the areas remained
demilitarized and that all persons residing in them were protectedfrom fear of armed
attack ....
Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S\23280, at 16 (1991) (emphasis added).
To underscore the significance of humanitarian assistance in the protection of the victims
themselves and the securing of the delivery of humanitarian assistance (i.e., meaning food, water
and medicines) to those in need, the Security Council introduced the concept of safe havens in
Resolutions 819 and 824. Resolution 819 specified that a safe area "should be free from any
armed attacks or any other hostile acts." S.C. Res. 819, supranote 63. Resolution 824 extended
this safe area designation to additional areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina and demanded
cooperation with UNPROFOR by all parties involved in respecting these safe areas. S.C. Res.
824, supra note 63. Ultimately, in response to a request from Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali,
NATO authorized air strikes to ensure the protection of these safe areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Resolution 913 (1994), U.N. Doc. S/1994/600
(1994). Thus, the right to protect victims and to deliver humanitarian aid was aggressively
defended with use of force.
Resolution 918 expanded UNAMIR's role in Rwanda to include the protection "of
displaced persons, refugees, and civilians at risk." S.C. Res. 918, supra note 65.
122. By Security Council Resolution 868,
The Security Council... 3. Urges States and parties to a conflict to cooperate closely
with the United Nations to ensure the security and safety of United Nations forces and
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The Security Council's claim of authority to establish the conditions necessary for democracy first appeared in resolutions regarding
Somalia."z Resolution 865 called
"national reconciliation in a free, democratic, and sovereign Somalia"
one of the three objectives of the U.N. Operation in Somalia II
(UNOSOM ll)." Resolution 814 cited a need for "steps leading to
the establishment of representative democratic institutions . . . ""
and pledged "to assist" Somalians "on a local, regional or national
level, to participate in free and fair elections .... "s Under Resolution 897, additional transitional steps to democracy included
"representative district and regional councils, . . . a transitional
council, ... ." and the "re-establish[ment] [of a] police force and...
judicial system."" 7
The emergence of secondary rights necessary for the effective
restoration of democracy are evident throughout the Security Council
resolutions regarding Haiti. They include: (1) the right to establish "a
proper and secure environment"1us for new legislative action; (2) the
right to establish and train a modem armed force under civilian
command; (3) the right to establish and train a new civilian police
force under civilian command; (4) the right to make preparations for
free and fair legislative elections;"' 29 (5) the right of safety of30U.N.
personnel; and (6) freedom of movement and communication.
The Security Council asserted secondary rights in Resolution 867
by imposing obligations on the state, claiming the rights "necessary
for the performance of its task" and called upon Haiti to "ensure"
those rights."
Specifically, the Security Council called upon the
personnel; 4. Confirms that attacks and use of force against persons engaged in a
United Nations operation authorized by the Security Council will be considered
interference with the exercise of the responsibilities of the Council and may require the
Council to consider measures it deems appropriate; 5. Confirms also that if, in the
Council's view, the host country is unable or unwilling to meet its obligations with
regard to the safety and security of a United Nations operation and personnel engaged
in the operation, the Council will consider what steps should be taken appropriate to
the situation ....
S.C. Res. 868, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3228th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/868 (1993).
123. See generally Franck, supra note 6 (discussing the concept of "texture of right").
124. S.C. Res. 865, U.N. SCOR., 48th Sess., 3280th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/865 (1993).
125. S.C. Res. 814, U.N. SCOR, 48th sess, 3188th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/814 (1993).
126. Id.
127. S.C. Res. 897, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3334th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/897 (1994).
128. S.C. Res. 917, supra note 17.
129. I&
130. S.C. Res. 867, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3282nd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/867 (1993).
131. Id.; see KIRGIS, supra note 19, at 854-857.
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Haitian Government to ensure the safety of U.N. personnel and the
"freedom of movement and communication" necessary "for the
successful implementation of the Mission."'"
VI. USE OF FORCE TO RESTORE DEMOCRACY ONLY IN
HUMANITARIAN CRISIS INVOLVING HUMAN RIGHTS
ATROCITIES
A. The Emerging Right of Humanitarian Assistance to Restore
Democracy is Independent of Chapter VII Obligations
The right of humanitarian assistance as discussed by SecretaryGeneral Boutros-Ghali is not necessarily based ona Security Council
finding of a threat to peace. 3 The strength of the obligation to
34
assist is based on the strength of the solidarity of humanity.'
Instead of acting under Chapter VII, the Security Council could act
to provide humanitarian assistance under article 24. The first paragraph of this article states that "Members confer on the Security
Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security" for the purpose of "ensur[ing] prompt and
effective action by the United Nations.' ' 3' The Namibia Advisory
Opinion delivered by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1971
states that "[t]he reference in paragraph 2 of this Article [24] to
specific powers of the Security Council under certain chapters of the
Charter does not exclude the existence of general powers to discharge
the responsibilities conferred in paragraph 1.,,13 Despite article 24's

132. S.C. Res. 867, supra note 130. Resolution 867 is consistent with the previous resolutions
in which the Security Council set forth the obligations of the state regarding the delivery of
humanitarian assistance. In Resolution 794 the Security Council affirmatively demands that "all
parties, movements, and factions in Somalia...": (1) "[I]mmediately cease hostilities, maintain
a cease-fire... and cooperate.., to promote the process of relief distribution, reconciliation
and political settlement ... ;" (2) "[T]ake all measures necessary to facilitate the efforts ...

to

provide urgent humanitarian assistance.. ;" (3) "[T]ake all measures necessary to ensure the
safety of United Nations and all other personnel engaged in the delivery of humanitarian
assistance ... ;" and (4) "[I]nmediately cease and desist from all breaches of international

humanitarian law ... ." S.C. Res. 794, supra note 64.
133. For a discussion of U.N. action under Chapter VII, requiring a finding of threat to the
peace, see infra part VI.C.3.
134. See Prez de Cuelar, supra note 1.
135. U.N. CHARTER art. 24, 1. Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr. poses the possibility of adopting
humanitarian assistance resolutions, in particular Resolution 688, under article 24 rather than
Chapter VII. KIRGIS, supra note 19, at 854.
136. Legal Consequences for States of The Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.CJ. 16,52
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basis for humanitarian assistance, the acknowledgement of such a
right and the growth of secondary rights necessary for the right to be
effective have taken place under the authority of Chapter VII. Since
the Security Council has chosen to address violations of human rights
and freedoms under' Chapter VII, it has been necessary for the
Security Council to find a threat to the peace in order to meet a duty
to assist and protect human rights.
B. Promotion of Democracy as a Condition Necessary for Peace and
Security is a Valid Objective of Chapter VII Measures
In Resolution 47/60A, the General Assembly emphasized that
certain closely related factors "provide the basis for an enduring and
stable universal peace and security."'" These factors include "respect for the right to self-determination and national independence,
economic and social development, the eradication of all forms of
domination and respect for basic human rights and fundamental
13 8
freedoms, as well as the need for preserving the environment.
As illustrated in Security Council resolutions regarding Somalia, the
United Nations has recently redefined its role as one of actively
promoting conditions for peace, particularly democracy. The significance of this development for Haiti is that it provides a precedent for
Security Council authority under Chapter VII to call for the restoration of democratic government and to help create the legislative,
judicial, and administrative bodies necessary therefore.
An early precedent for democratic restoration exists in the U.N.
Operation in the Congo (ONUC) mandate.'39 In August, 1960, then
Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold requested the Security Council
to clarify the mandate of ONUC in August 1960, stating,
[The Security Council] should also find its way to formulate principles for the United Nations presence, which, in accordance with the
Purposes and Principles of the Charter, would safeguard democratic
rights and protect the spokesman of all different political views
within the large entity of the Congo so as to make it possible for
(June 21).
137. Review of the Implementation of the Declarationon the Strengthening of International
Security, G.A. Res. 47/60A, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 80, U.N. Doc. A147149
(1992).
138. Id. (emphasis added).
139. Thomas M. Franck, The Security Counciland "Threatsto the Peace":Some Remarks On
Remarkable Recent Developments, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROLE OF THE SECURrTY

COUNCM PEACE-KEEPING AND PEACE-BUILDING 83, 92-95 (Rene-Jean Dupuy ed., 1993).
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them to make their voice heard in democratic forms; this is not an
easy matter, because it will require a sensitive development of the
United Nations activities, but I am sure it can be done, and I feel
strongly that the United Nations would have failed in its mission if
it maintained
order while permitting democratic principles to be
violated.'4°

More recently, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali advocated this
role for the United Nations when he stated that "[t]he United Nations
must foster, through its peace-building measures, the process of
democratization in situations characterized by long-standing conflicts,
both within and among nations.' 14' This enlarged mandate, directed
at promoting democracy as a condition of peace, will shape the degree
of involvement and the variety of tasks undertaken in peace enforcement. As Scheffer states, "[m]ore recently, the growth of democracy
as a legal principle among nations will influence the manner in which
certain humanitarian interventions will be carried out."''
The Security Council claims the authority under Chapter VII,
while conducting a peace-keeping operation, to attempt to establish
the elements giving rise to democracy. The Security Council made
this claim in the Somalian context in Resolution 775.143

This

resolution increased the size and mandate of UNOSOM to establish
a secure environment in Somalia.'" In so doing, the Security
Council called for "broad-based consultations and deliberations to
achieve reconciliation, agreement on the setting up of transitional
government institutions and consensus on basic principles and steps
leading to the establishment of representative democratic institutions.
,145

Later, the Security Council reaffirmed the position taken in
Resolution 775, and expressed "its readiness to assist the people of

140. 15 SCOR, 884th meeting (SXPV. 884), at 5 (1960), quoted in KIRoIS, supranote 19, at
753 (emphasis added).
141. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Report of the Secretary-Generalon the Work of the Organization, 46 U.N.Y.B. 3,24, U.N. Doc. A147/407.
142. Scheffer, supra note 60, at 291-92. Within the Document of Copenhagen is a
"conviction that full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the development
of societies based on pluralistic democracy and the rule of law are prerequisites for progress in
setting up the lasting order of peace, security, justice and co-operation that [the participating
states] seek to establish in Europe." Copenhagen Document, supra note 26, at 1307; see also
Scheffer, supra note 60, at 276.
143. S.C. Res. 775, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3110th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/775 (1992).
144. Id.For a discussion of Resolution 775, see KIRoIs, supra note 19, at 875-876.
145. S.C. Res. 814, supra note 125 (emphasis added).
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Somalia, as appropriate, on a local, regional or national level, to
participate in free and fair elections, with, a view towards achieving
and implementing a political settlement ..

.

." 6 The bold and

revolutionary nature of this peace enforcement operation is found
again in Resolution 865, emphasizing UNOSOM I's "objectives of
facilitation of humanitarian assistance and the restoration of law and
order, and of national reconciliation in a free, democratic and
sovereign Somalia ...

,,147

The Security Council is not a world government and thus does
not, in the exercise of its new mandate, impose forms of government
or institutions on a population. In discussing the U.N. purpose in
Somalia, the Security Council "recogniz[ed] that the people of
Somalia bear the ultimate responsibility for setting up viable national
political institutions and for reconstructing their country .... 3148
While the United Nations can establish the environment necessary for
a functioning democracy, and even hold an election, ultimately
democracy would have to be the form of government desired by the
people of the state.
C. Use of Chapter VII Powers to Restore Democracy in the Haiti
Crisis
1. Facts of the crisisin Haiti. The overthrow of the democratically elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the obstruction by the
military of his return to office, and the frustration of democracy
prevent realization of the Haitian people's attempt through free and
fair elections to choose their form of government. Aristide came to
power in elections organized and observed by the U.N. Observer
Group for the Verification of the Elections in Haiti (ONUVEH), a
U.N. mission which was dispatched by the Secretary-General pursuant
to General Assembly Resolution 45/2.141 Sixty-four ONUVEH
security observers developed and executed an "electoral security
plan."'
By ONUVEH's count, "between 62.5 per cent and 71.4
per cent of the 3,227,155 registered voters had cast their ballots,'5 1

146. Id.
147. S.C. Res. 865, supra note 124.

148. S.C. Res. 897, supranote 127.
149. HaitiHolds Free Democratic Elections with U.N. Help,supra note 38, at 64; GA Res.
45/2, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/2 (1990).
150. Haiti holds free, democratic elections with U.N. help, supranote 38, at 64.
151. Id. at 63.
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with Aristide winning 67.5% of the vote. 2 Thus, the United
Nations can verify that the election was democratic, with the votes
Furthermore, from its direct involvement
cast "freely and fairly."''
in Haiti's democratic election, the United Nations can claim to have
a special interest in democracy inHaiti." 4
Throughout most of the crisis in Haiti, the Organization of
American States (OAS) was the leading advocate of the restoration
of democracy and the return of President Aristide to office. The
activist role of the OAS regarding Haiti was engendered by the June
1991 adoption of the Santiago Resolution. The Haitian crisis
constituted the first overthrow of democracy following the adoption
of the Santiago Resolution. Convening under the Santiago Resolution, the Permanent Council of the OAS called for "an end to the
violation of Haitian people's rights" and the restoration of the
"President's exercise of his constitutional authority."'5 ' The OAS
called for the reinstatement of President Aristide and urged all states
to isolate Haiti diplomatically and commercially,5 6 and further
asked the Secretary-General to urge the Security Council to adopt a
similar measure.5 7 While the Security Council choose not to do
so,' the General Assembly requested "the Secretary-General of the
United Nations, in accordance with his functions, to consider
providing support sought by the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States in implementing the mandates arising from
resolutions MRE/RES. 1/91 and MRE/RES. 2/91 .... .""'

On September 10, 1992, the U.N. Secretary-General announced
to the Security Council that he would cooperate with the OAS, then

152. Id.; Deputy Secretary Talbott, Pursuingthe Restoration of Democracy in Hait4 5 U.S.
DEP'r ST. DISPATCH 331, 331 (1994) (noting that Aristide won nearly 70% of the vote)
[hereinafter Talbott Statement].
153. Talbott Statement, supra note 152.
154. Id. Ambassador Adolfo Raul Taylhardat of Venezuela noted that the Security Council
had been involved with and encouraged the steps that brought about democracy and the election
of the present legitimate government of Haiti. He noted further that the international
community's commitment to Haitians has borne no fruit because of the actions of the military
in Haiti. Statement of Ambassador Adolfo Raul Taylhardat of Venezuela, U.N. Press Release
SC5718 (1993).
155. OAS Resolution MRE/RES. 567, supra note 104, 4.
156. OAS Res. MRE/RES 1/91, supranote 106, 1 6; see also KiRGIS, supra note 19, at 711.
157. OAS Res. MRE/RES 2/91, supranote 107, § III, 4.
158. KIRGIS, supra note 19, at 711.
159. G.A. Res. 46/7, 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/7 (1991).

360

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 5:329

contemplating an observer mission to Haiti.1" The SecretaryGeneral dispatched, together with the OAS, a civilian mission to
observe and investigate human rights violations.161 In Resolution
47/20, the General Assembly condemned the replacement of President
Aristide and urged member states "to renew their support, within the
framework of the Charter of the United Nations and international
law, by adopting measures in accordance with [OAS resolutions]
especially as they relate to the strengthening of representative
democracy, the constitutional order and to the embargo on trade with
Haiti ... ."" Finally, by Resolution 841 of June 16, 1993, the
Security Council took note of OAS resolutions and affirmed "that the
solution of the crisis in Haiti should take into account" the OAS
resolutions prior to imposing an oil embargo on Haiti, freezing the
nation's funds, and establishing a committee of the Security Council
to monitor the embargo."6
On July 3, 1992, President Aristide and junta leader LieutenantGeneral Raoul Cedras signed the Governors Island Agreement, a pact
that required Cedras to resign and should have returned Aristide to
Haiti on October 30, 1993. Aristide would then appoint a new
commander-in-chief of the armed forces and nominate a prime
minister, with the latter selection to be ratified subsequently by the
Parliament.' 6 By Resolution 861 of August 27, 1993, the Security
Council suspended sanctions after having received notice that the
Prime Minister was confirmed and had assumed office in Haiti. 165

160. General Assembly Resolution 47/20, adopted by the General Assembly on November
24,1992, requested "the Secretary-General of the United Nations to take the necessary measures
in order to assist, in cooperation with the Organization of American States, in the solution of
the Haitian crisis .... G.A. Res 47/20, 5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47V20 (Nov. 24, 1992).
161. A Step Towards Democracy, U.N. CHRON., June, 1993 at 29.
162. G.A. Res. 47/20, supra note 160, 6.
163. S.C. Res. 841, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3238th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/841 (1993).
Acting under Chapter VII, the Security Council "[d]etermin[ed] that, in these unique and
exceptional circumstances, the continuation of this situation threatens international peace and
security in the region.. . ." Id. The Security Council found "a unique and exceptional
situation" in the request by the "legitimate" government of Haiti together with coordinated
action taken by the OAS and by the General Assembly of the U.N. Id.
The preamble to Resolution 841 indicates that the coordinated action includes the report
of the Secretary-General regarding Haiti, OAS resolutions regarding Haiti, General Assembly
resolutions supporting OAS action, combined leadership of the Secretary-General of the United
Nations and the Secretary-General of the OAS,together with the "efforts of the international
community to reach a political solution to the crisis in Haiti," efforts undertaken by Mr. Dante
Caputo, the Special Envoy for Haiti of the U.N. and OAS Secretaries-General. Id.
164. TransitionAgreement Signed on GovernorsIsland, U.N. CHRON., Sept., 1993, at 8, 8.
165. S.C. Res. 861, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3271st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/861 (1993).
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By Resolution 862 of August 31, 1993, the Security Council sent an
"advance team" of approximately thirty personnel to prepare for the
arrival of the civilian police and military assistance elements of the
U.N. mission bound for Haiti.'6 Noting that there was an urgent
need to ensure conditions for the full implementation of the Governors Island Agreement and a subsequent agreement, the New York
Pact, 67 the Security Council authorized the dispatch of the U.N.
Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) in Resolution 867.'"

After the deployment of the UNMIH was prevented by supporters of the military regime, sanctions under Resolutions 841 and
873169 were reimposed by Resolution 875.7 In a series of resolutions adopted subsequently, the Security Council sought to restore a
Aristide, in the framework
Haitian democracy and reinstate President
7
'
Agreement.'
Island
Governors
the
of
In Resolution 917, the Security Council acted expressly under
Chapter VII to impose sanctions upon and isolate Haiti."2 The
Security Council cited the junta's intransigence and subsequent failure
7
to implement an agreed solution as constituting a threat to peace.1'
166. S.C. Res. 862, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3272 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/862 (1993).
167. In fulfilling a term of the Governors Island Agreement, Haiti's political leaders agreed
to permit that country's parliament to ratify Aristide's nomination of a prime minister. Richard
Bernstein, HaitiansAchieve "PoliticalTruce", N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1993, § 1, at 7.
168. S.C Res. 867, supra note 130.
169. S.C. Res. 873, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3291st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/873 (1993); S.C.
Res. 841, supra note 163.
170. S.C. Res. 875, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3293rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/875 (1993).
171. In discussing the adoption of Resolution 875, Ambassador Li Zhaoxing of China noted
that China's support arose in part from the formal request by Aristide, the support by Latin
American countries and the OAS. Statement of Ambassador Li Zhaoxing of China, U.N. Press
Release SC15718 (1993).
172. Specifically, the Security Council acted to: (1) impose an embargo on all commercial
goods; (2) freeze funds of officers of the military, major participants in the coup, and employees
of the military; (3) suspend all flights to and from Haiti, except for humanitarian purposes; and
(4) impose a maritime interception to enforce the embargo. The Council condemned "numerous
instances of extra-judicial killings, arbitrary arrests, illegal detentions, abductions, rape and
enforced disappearances, the continued denial of freedom of expression, and the impunity with
which armed civilians have been able to operate and continue operating... ." S.C. Res. 917,
supra note 49.
173. Deputy Secretary Talbott notes the existence of external effects which are not direct
or immediate, statingIf the international and hemispheric community allows thugs... to rob and terrorize
the people of Haiti, that country is likely to become a haven and a breeding ground
for the forces of instability and criminality in the region ....The regime is presiding
over a steadily worsening humanitarian catastrophe, raising the specter of a refugee
crisis that impinges on the vital interests of all countries in the region, especially Haiti's
neighbors.
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On June 7, 1994, the OAS took the additional step of prohibiting all
commercial flights entering or leaving Haiti, froze assets of Haiti and
proscribed financial dealings with Haiti.174 On July 31, 1994, the
Security Council, acting under Chapter VII, authorized a multinational force to intervene militarily in Haiti to restore the democratically
elected government.'75
The sensitivities of OAS member states to intervention in the
Southern Hemisphere prevented the OAS from endorsing the use of
force to oust the military junta.176 During a meeting at the OAS in
Washington on May 13, 1994, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, and Uruguay
rejected the use of force under any circumstances." Mexico and
Cuba also rejected use of force. 78 During the Security Council
meeting of July 31, 1994, Mexico, Cuba, Uruguay and Venezuela
spoke before the Security Council in opposition to use of force to
restore democracy in Haiti, arguing that Haiti did not constitute a
threat to international peace and security. 79 To the extent that
Talbot Statement, supra note 152, at 331.
In the context of the "unique and exceptional
circumstances," the Security Council definitively states that "the situation created by the failure
of the military authorities in Haiti to fulfill their obligations under the Governors Island
Agreement and to comply with relevant Security Council resolutions constitutes a threat to
peace and security in the region.... ." S.C. Res. 917, supra note 49.
174. OAS.Tightens Sanctions on Haiti Government, THE RECORD, June 8, 1994, at 18.
175. S.C. Res. 940, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3413 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (1994). Under
the resolution, member states were authorized "to form a multinational force under unified
command ... and to use all necessary means" to implement its stated goals: the "departure"
of the "military leadership," the return of Aristide, and the establishment of "a secure and stable
environment" that would permit implementation of the Governors Island Agreement. Id. The
Security Council found "that the situation in Haiti continues to constitute a threat to peace and
security in the region .

. . ."

Without specifying what the "situation" includes, the Security

Council emphasized: (1) support for action under Chapter VII from the Secretary-General,
Aristide, and the permanent representative of Haiti to the United Nations; (2) the terms of the
Agreement and the Pact of New York and the violations of these agreements by the military;
and (3) the "deterioration of the humanitarian situation" in Haiti, in particular the "continuing
escalation by the illegal de facto regime of systematic violations of civil liberties, the desperate
plight of Haitian refugees and the recent expulsion of the staff of the International Civilian
Mission (MICIVH)."
The Preamble expresses a broader purpose in reaffirming the
"commitment" of the international community to "assist and support" the development of Haiti.
It
Resolution 940 was adopted by twelve affirmative votes, no negative votes and two
abstentions on the part of Brazil and China. See Security Council Authorizes Multinational
Force,supra note 53.
176. Howard W. French, Latin Americans Reject Use of Forceto UnseatHaitiMilitary, INT'L
HERALD TRiBuNE, May 14, 1994, availablein LEXIS, NEWS Library, NON-US File.
177. Id.The United States, Argentina, and Antigua had attempted to include support for
use of force in Haiti in an OAS resolution, but were unsuccessful. Id.
178. Id.
179. Security Council Authorizes Multinational Force,supra note 53.
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these nations appear to reject democratic intervention out of a fear
that it will be used to correct human rights abuses at home, their
disapproval loses its credibility."s
Conversely, the new Secretary-General of the OAS, Cesar
Gaviria, immediately endorsed the U.S. initiative and pledged to
President Clinton the support of the OAS for U.S. action in Haiti.'8 '
Ultimately, ten Caribbean nations and Argentina agreed to contribute
to the multinational force needed to restore democracy in Haiti."
Even though the U.S. troops landed in Haiti under an agreement
obtained from the military junta under much duress, on September 24,
1994, the OAS communicated to President Clinton, "its satisfaction
being made in reaching a peaceful resolution of the
with the progress
'
Haitian crisis."'
On September 18, 1994, pressured by the specter of an American-led invasion, Lieut. Gen. Raoul Cedras and Brig. Gen. Philippe
Biamby, the military Chief of Staff, agreed to step down by October
15 and allow President Aristide to resume power in Haiti." On
September 19, 1994, three thousand U.S. troops commenced phase I
of "Operation Restore Democracy" by entering Haiti and securing all
airports and ports. s
2. HAITI as a good model for intervention. The overthrow of
democracy has recently been seen as a serious threat to peace. In
Resolution 794, the Security Council did not require an external
effect, or direct effect outside the borders of Somalia, in finding that

180. Anthony D'Amato makes this argument in regards to the lack of support of the OAS
for the 1991 invasion of Panama. D'Amato, supranote 7, at 516.
181. OAS Chief Meets With Clinton On Haiti, UPI, Sept. 20, 1994, available in LEXIS,
NEWS Library, UPI File.
182. Wolf Blitzer, Rhetoric Increases in Possible HaitiInvasion, (CNN television broadcast,
Sept. 8,1994), availablein LEXIS, NEWS Library, CNN File; Anthony Boadle, U.S. Forces Run
Into Potentially Volatile Situation in Haiti, Reuters World Service, Sept. 21, 1994, available in
LEXIS, NEWS Library, REVWLD File. More than twenty-four nations contributed to the
multinational force. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Remarks at the Meeting of the
Coalition of Nations Contributing Troops to the Defense of Democracy in Haiti, (Sept. 16,1994)
(transcript availablein LEXIS, NEWS Library, FEDNEW File).
183. Martin Walker, Clinton Gets OAS Go-Ahead But His Allies Stay Offihore, THE
GUARDIAN, Sept. 24, 1994 at 16, 16.
184. This agreement followed negotiations with Clinton envoys, former President Jimmy
Carter, Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia and Gen. Colin L. Powell, and included a promise of
amnesty for those stepping down. Douglas Jehl, Haiti's Military Leaders Agree to Resign;
Clinton Halts Assaul; Recalls 61 Planes: Troops in Today, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1994, at 1.
185. Larry Rohter, 3000 U.S. Troops Land Without Opposition and Take Over Ports and
Airfields in Haiti,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1994, at 1.
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"the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in
Somalia" constituted a threat to peace.1 6 It appears to be the first
time that the Security Council found that an internal breach of human
rights, regardless of the presence or absence of external effects, could
rise to the level of a threat to peace. Arguably, the determinant
seems to be whether the Security Council finds the violation to be
unacceptable.
Certainly, the overthrow of democracy in the circumstances of
the Haitian crisis can be found to be "unacceptable." According to
Professor Harold Koh, Haiti presents a "textbook" case.' 7 First,
ONUVEH, the U.N. electoral monitoring mission established by the
Secretary-General, supervised and observed the December 16, 1991,
elections. After a successful voter registration campaign, secret ballot
elections took place at public polling places "in a climate of freedom
Second, the large voter
and security, free from all pressures.""
turnout' can be interpreted as an indication of strong feelings
about the candidate as well as an indication of a significant trust in,
and enthusiasm for, democracy. Third, Aristide was the clear winner,
receiving 67.5% of the votes cast.
Haiti presents a case where the electorate made a definite choice.
The sovereign will of the population did not prevail because of the
assertion of power and violence by a regime lacking democratic
legitimacy. The imposition of a military regime by Cedras is a form
of aggression and domination violative of the right of a population to
determine its form of government and those officials who comprise
such a government. Under Reisman's theory of popular sovereignty,
the military coup in Haiti is clearly a violation of popular sovereignty
"by an indigenous . . . force."'" It is the aggression against and
domination of a people that gives rise to a self-defense justification of
humanitarian assistance to restore the democratic government which
had been elected openly, freely and fairly.
Indisputably, the toppling of democracy can have an external
effect. The message to potential usurpers of power would be that
fragile democracies are up for grabs. Deterrence is a major end

186. S.C. Res. 794, supra note 64.
187. Harold Ju Koh, Professor ofInternational Law at Yale University, Director of the
Center for International Human Rights, Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on the Haitian Refugee Fairness Act (Mar. 8, 1990).
188. HaitiHolds Free, Democratic Elections with UN Help, supra note 38, at 64.
189. See note 150 and accompanying text.
190. Reisman, supra note 7, at 872.
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product of enforcement under Chapter VII of the right to democratic
restoration. Democracy has become linked to peace as have few
other human rights. In fact, democracy is now considered necessary
for peace.' 9'
3. Violent overthrow or obstruction of legitimate democracy is
sufficient groundsfor a finding of a threat to peace under article 39.
Under article 39 of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, the Security
Council must find a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act
of aggression prior to adopting measures under articles 41 and 42 "to
maintain or restore international peace and security.'"
The
Security Council previously has acted under Chapter VII in two well
known instances to protect the rights of peoples to participate freely
in the civil and political affairs of their nation: Rhodesian independence and South African Apartheid.
The declaration of independence of Rhodesia from the United
Kingdom in 1965 prompted the Security Council to condemn the
illegal and racist regime which took power and to impose on Rhodesia
an embargo on goods and investments."9 Similarly, in Security
Council Resolution 418, the Security Council imposed an arms
embargo against South Africa and "cal[ed] upon [South Africa]
urgently to end violence against the African people and to take
urgent steps to eliminate apartheid and racial discrimination."'"
These provide sound precedents for Security Council action under
Chapter VII to address a government's treatment of its own citizens
in the absence of civil war.'95

191. Secretary.General'sAnnual Report on the Work of the OrganizationSays Organization
Is "Humanity's Best Hope" For Peace, U.N. Press Release SG/2003 (1993).
192. U.N. CHARTER art. 39. "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations,
or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or
restore international peace and security." Id.
193. S.C. Res. 216, U.N. SCOR, 20th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/216 (1965) (calling upon "all
States not to recognize" the racist minority regime in Rhodesia); S.C. Res. 253 U.N. SCOR, 23d
Sess., 1428th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/253 (1968) (calling for an embargo on goods and
investments in Rhodesia).
194. S.C. Res. 418, U.N. SCOR, 32nd Sess., 2046th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/418 (1977).
Security Council Resolution 418 also referred to attacks by South Africa against neighboring
states and found that "having regard to the policies and acts of the South African Government,
that the acquisition by South Africa of arms and related matriel constitutes a threat to the
maintenance of international peace and security." Id.
195. Franck, supra note 139, at 95-97.
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More recently, the Security Council has found an internal
violation of human rights to constitute a threat to the peace. On
April 5, 1991, the Security Council adopted Resolution 688, which
"condemn[ed] the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many
parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish-populated areas, the
'196
consequences of which threaten international peace and security.
This constitutes a precedent for finding a threat to peace in violations
of human rights which take place wholly within the territory of a
state.
On December 3, 1992, the Security Council determined "that the
magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia,
further exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution
of humanitarian assistance, constitutes a threat to international peace
and security."1" For the first time, the Security Council made clear
that the human tragedy in itself, rather than the consequences of the
situation in Somalia for neighboring countries or the region, constituted a threat to international peace and security. Internal violations of
human rights with no external effects may constitute a threat to
peace.
The Security Council resolutions regarding Haiti indicate that
the Security Council may consider the following conditions in finding
a government or governmental process to constitute a threat to peace
and security in a region:
1. any government that is not a democracy;
2. any government that is not a democracy and is violently repressive;
3. any government that is not a democracy and came to power by
the violent overthrow of a legitimate democracy;
4. any government that is not a democracy and stubbornly resists
the U.N.; ,
5. any government that is not a democracy and violates its legal
obligations under a settlement agreement;
6. any government that is not a democracy, came to power by
overthrowing a legitimate democracy, and is actively opposed on
that basis by nations and organizations in the region; or
7. any government that is not a democracy and threatens the
security of other nations, whether by direct or indirect external
effects such as massive refugee flow.

196. S.C. Res. 688, supra note 62.
197. S.C. Res. 794, supra note 64.
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All factors listed above characterize the crisis in Haiti. A conclusion might be drawn that it is on the basis of all factors listed above
that the Security Council acted. 19
In Resolution 917, the Security Council, acting under Chapter
VII, "reaffirm[ed] its determination that, in these unique and
exceptional circumstances, the situation created by the failure of the
military authorities in Haiti to fulfill their obligations under the
Governors Island Agreement and to comply with relevant Security
Council resolutions constitutes a threat to peace and security in the
region."' 199 In calling Haiti's circumstances "unique and exceptional," perhaps the Security Council is warning against generalizations
regarding the finding of the threat to peace in the overthrow or
obstruction of democracy.'
The support of the world community, the obstruction of the
restoration of democracy by the military, and major human rights
violations are all set forth as factors in Resolutions 917 and 940. 2 '
In addition, Resolution 940 emphasizes the support of the SecretaryGeneral, the "unique,... deteriorating, complex and extraordinary
nature" of the crisis, and the breach by the military of the Governors
Island Agreement and Security Council resolutions.- z
Both the Haitian military's refusal to cooperate in implementing
the Governors Island Agreement and its disregard of Security Council
resolutions aimed at restoring democracy help form the basis of the
findings of a threat to peace. 3 The language of Resolution 917
198. However, arguably, the principal elements which characterize the Haitian crisis are the
following:
1. the violent overthrow of a democracy that had been legitimized by U.N. monitoring
and, therefore, the disruption of a process of democratization in which the U.N. had
been a partner;,
2. the installment of a dictatorship by the military in the place of the democracy and
a continuing refusal to reinstate the ousted democratic government; and
3. the regular violation of fundamental human rights.

199. S.C. Res. 917, supra note 49.
200. Id.
201. S.C. Res 940, supranote 175. Resolution 940 finds "that the situation in Haiti continues

to constitute a threat to peace and security in the region .... Id.
202. Id.

203. The Security Council emphasizes the obstruction of the restoration of democracy in
Resolution 940 by stating that "the illegal de facto regime in Haiti has failed to comply with the
Governors Island Agreement and is in breach of its obligations and relevant resolutions .... "
Id.
Kooijmans finds that "it is an abuse of sovereignty if a Government refuses to co-operate
with the Organization, with the possible consequence that the Organization will be forced to
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offers significant support for the idea that intransigence in restoring
democracy alone can rise to the level of a threat to peace.m4 When
the failure to cooperate results in violent, continuing and regular
transgressions of the sovereign rights of a population by obstructing
the popular will of the electorate, the Security Council gains Chapter
VII jurisdiction. Implementing the will of the people expressed in the
free and fair election of Aristide is the non-negotiable remedy
enforced by the Security Council under Chapter VII in the face of a
usurpation of power by Cedras in violation of the popular sovereignty
of Haiti.
National and regional instruments may also consider a threat to
the peace resulting from the usurpation of a population's democratic
rights. The Executive Summary of the PDD lists as a factor to be
considered in the support of a peace operation the presence of a
threat to or breach of international peace and security. 5 Clinton
administration policy is to consider the "sudden interruption of established democracy coupled with violence or threat of violence" as a
threat to or breach of international peace and security.'
The
Moscow Document supports this criteria in stating that "the participating States . . . will support vigorously, in accordance with the

Charter of the United Nations, in case of overthrow or attempted

intervene, at a later stage, and at much higher cost for the Organization as well as for the
population, if the crisis becomes really explosive." Peter H. Kooijmans, The Enlargementof the
Concept "Threat to the Peace," in PEACE-KEEPING AND PEACE-BUILDING, THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE ROLE OF TH SEcuRrrY COuNCIL 120 (Rene-Jean Dupuy ed., 1993). Franck also notes
this possibility in the context of Resolution 687 stating "[t]hat a Member State's 'uncooperative
behaviour' can rise to the level of a threat to the peace and implicate the use of collective
measures to compel co-operation with international normative standards beyond those specified
as binding obligations of the Charter.. . " Franck, supra note 139, at 99.
204. S.C. Res. 917, supra note 49.
205. A threat to or breach of international peace and security is defined under the PDD as
one or a combination of the following: international aggression, urgent humanitarian disaster
coupled with violence, or sudden interruption of established democracy or gross violation of
human rights coupled with violence or threat of violence. PDD, supra note 113, at 802-03.
206. Reisman, in discussing a scenario analogous to that in Haiti, notes that "in circumstances in which free elections are internationally supervised and the results are internationally
endorsed as free and fair and the people's choice is clear, the world community does not need
to speculate on what constitutes popular sovereignty in that country." Reisman, supra note 7,
at 871. Again, "sovereignty can be violated as effectively and ruthlessly by an indigenous as by
an outside force, in much the same way that the wealth and natural resources of a country can
be spoliated as thoroughly and efficiently by a native as by a foreigner." Id. at 872. Gross
violations of fundamental human rights in addition to the violation of the right of a population
to be governed by those officials it chose in free and fair elections should not be required under
international law for intervention. A usurper who perpetrates violations of additional human
rights only strengthens the case under Chapter VII.
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overthrow of a legitimately elected government of a participating
State by undemocratic means, the legitimate organs of that State
upholding human rights, democracy and the rule of law.... ."2w In
addition, the Moscow Document "recognize[d] the need.., to make
It appears that the Mosdemocratic advances irreversible .... ."'
cow Document requires the overthrow of the democratic government
"by undemocratic means" as a prerequisite to intervention in
Viewed in this context, the
accordance with the U.N. Charter.
rationale of intervention in Haiti appears consistent with the
determination that the world will not be allowed to slip back in its
advances toward democracy.210 Thus, intervention in Haiti can be
seen as a warning to other usurpers that they will be resisted. Hence,
intervention becomes a matter of deterrence.
4. Concernfor protectionof sovereignty is prominentthroughout
the resolutionsregardingHaitL The protection of human rights must
be accompanied by respect for sovereignty as redefined. Former
Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cu6llar stated in his 1991 report:
It seems to be beyond question that violations of human rights
imperil peace, while disregard of the sovereignty of States would
spell chaos. The maximum caution needs to be exercised lest the
defense of human rights becomes a platform for encroaching on the
essential domestic jurisdiction of States and eroding their sovereignty. Nothing would be a surer prescription for anarchy than an
abuse of this principle?"
The Secretary-General manifested a sensitivity to issues of sovereignty. In setting forth three caveats of humanitarian assistance, he
required that the protection of human rights be unbiased and all
states be treated equally. In addition, P6rez de Cu6llar called for the
protection of human rights to be in accordance with the U.N. Charter.
Lastly, the former Secretary-General held that measures taken to
redress deprivations of human rights be proportional to the violation
of those rights.212 Further, the General Assembly Resolution on
207. Moscow Document, supranote 32, at 1677.

208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Comment of Anne-Marie Burley, National Sovereignty Revisited: Perspectives On the
Emerging Norm of Democracy In InternationalLaw, 86 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 267 (1992);
see also Fox, PoliticalParticipation,American Society, supra note 11, at 249.
211. Pdrez de Cu~llar, supra note 1, at 8.
212. Id.
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Strengthening the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergency
Assistance of the United Nations stated that "[t]he sovereignty,
territorial integrity and national unity of States must be fully respected in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations" when
assistance is given."
Protection of sovereignty as described by
Michael Reisman would involve safeguarding "the continuing capacity
of a population freely to express and affect choices about the
identities and policies of its governors."214
Reflecting a concern about sovereignty, sensitivity to the
positions taken by nations in the region of conflict is apparent in the
emphasis of the Security Council on the supporting parallel measures
undertaken by the OAS regarding Haiti. Resolution 841 states that
OAS efforts regarding Haiti call for "extraordinary measures" to be
taken by the Security Council. 215 The request of the "legitimate
government" of Haiti for Chapter VII enforcement measures was
significant in the Security Council's decision to act in Resolutions 862
and 940,216 and the request from the Permanent Representative of
Haiti is stated to be significant in Resolution 841."7 The General
Assembly Resolution on Strengthening the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance of the United Nations places responsibility for humanitarian assistance primarily on the state. 8 The
affected state "has the responsibility first and foremost" to provide for
victims and "has the primary role in the initiation, organization,
coordination, and implementation of humanitarian assistance within
its territory.,2 9 Each state is asked to "facilitate the work of these
organizations in implementing humanitarian assistance, in particular
the supply of food, medicines, shelter and health care, for which
access to victims is essential."' 20

213. Assistance Resolution, supra note 78, at 49.
214. Reisman, supra note 7, at 872.
215. S.C. Res. 841, supra note 163.
216. Under Reisman's theory of popular sovereignty, Aristide's government, chosen by the
people of Haiti in democratic elections, was the legitimate government of that country, and, as
such, its request or consent would indicate that the sovereignty of Haiti was not being violated
by the Security Council's action. See Reisman, supra note 7, at 871.
217. S.C. Res. 841, supra note 163.
218. Assistance Resolution, supra note 78, at 49.
219. Id. at Annex, 4.
220. Id. at Annex, 6. This designation of responsibility is consistent with the responsibility
placed on Haiti under Resolution 867 to: (1) "ensure the safety of the United Nations
personnel;" (2) "ensure the freedom of movement and communication of the Mission;" (3)
ensure "other rights necessary for the performance of its task;" and (4) "renounce violence as
a means of political expression." S.C. Res. 867, supra note 130.

1995]

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO RESTORE DEMOCRACY

371

In Resolutions 873, 875 and 917, the Security Council places
responsibility for the increased sanctions directly on Haiti's military
authorities."' The program was very clearly communicated to
Cedras and the military. If intransigence increased, the sanctions
increased as per the warning of Resolution 873 ' On the other
hand, under Resolution 917, if the military cooperates, sanctions will
be reduced or lifted.' The Security Council was very clear that it
was not imposing a solution on the parties. It was, however,
enforcing an agreement reached between the disputants. 4 Ambassador Albright, in voting to terminate suspension of sanctions, stated:
"[T]he military leaders . . . violated a solemn agreement. That
agreement sought to resolve peacefully the governmental crisis in
This view was reflected by Latin American countheir country."'
tries as well, as Ambassador Taylhardat of Venezuela said, "[t]he
Haitian authorities had not only not carried out their commitment,
they had put obstacles in the way of implementing the Agreement. , z
Ambassador Albright described efforts towards democracy in
Haiti as "steps" taken by the "people of Haiti"' and "the results
As Ambassador Edward
of the struggle of the Haitian people."'
S. Marker of the United States observed during the Security Council
debates on Resolution 867, "[c]ivic institutions must be refashioned
as the building blocks of a democratic society. Those institutions
must have legitimacy in the eyes of the Haitian people, be accountable to the Haitian people, operate on behalf of the Haitian people,
and reflect the unique character and courage of those people." 9

221. S.C. Res. 873, supra note 169; S.C. Res. 875, supra note 170; S.C. Res. 917, supra note
49.
222. S.C. Res. 873, supra note 169.
223. S.C. Res. 917, supra note 49.
224. Because of "fears that the Council could impose a political settlement upon the parties,"
Chapters VI and VII of the U.N. Charter were crafted so that Security Council recommendations are not binding. GOODRICH ET AL, supra note 49, at 300.
225. Statement of Madeleine K. Albright, U.N. Press Release SC15716 (1993).
226. Statement of Ambassador Adolfo Raul Tayihardat of Venezuela, U.N. Press Release
SC15716 (1993).
227. Statement of Amb. Madeleine K. Albright of the United States, U.N. Press Release
sC15692 (1993).
228. Statement of Arab. Fritz Longchamps of Haiti, U.N. Press Release SC/5692 (1993).
229. Statement of Arab. Edward S. Marker of the United States, U.N. Press Release SC15705
(1993).
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VII. USE OF FORCE IN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
TO RESTORE DEMOCRACY
Upon finding a threat to the peace, the Security Council can
claim Chapter VII authority to act under article 42, involving
measures using force, as well as under article 41, involving nonforcible measures. Franck asserts regarding intervention, "[i]n theory,
if Chapter VII of the Charter is applicable for purposes of economic
measures, it is also possible to defend collective recourse to military
measures."
There is some difference of opinion regarding whether measures involving use of force may be enacted without first trying
article 41 measures or whether a delay is required to make certain
article 41 measures will not have further effect. There is no such
requirement specifically expressed in the Charter. There is, however,
a requirement that measures enacted be proportional to the threat
posed; former Secretary-General P6rez de Cu6llar and others hold
that "proportionality is of utmost importance" in humanitarian
intervention."' Certainly, it is logical that enforcement measures
less severe than article 42 be adopted first, if circumstances permit
and if it is reasonable to presume that article 41 measures would be
effective. Refusal of violators to cooperate would be reason to move
to harsher measures and, ultimately, assuming the suffering and
depravation of the population warrants, intervention using force, as
Resolutions 917 and 940 illustrate. 2
The policy of the Clinton administration expressly contemplates
the use of force in a Chapter VII peace operation or even a "regionally sponsored peace operation," in the event of the "sudden interruption of established democracy.., coupled with violence, or threat of
violence . .. ."I Specifically, the policy requires that "[f]or peace
enforcement (Chapter VII) operations, the threat to international
The Clinton
peace and security [be] considered significant."'
administration applies harsher standards if the assessment being made
is whether to involve U.S. personnel in a peace operation; it would

230. Franck, supra note 40, at 170.
231. Pdrez de Cu6llar, supra note 1, at 8.
232. S.C. Res. 917, supra note 49; S.C. Res. 940, supra note 175.
233. PDD supra note 113, at 802, 803. The participating States of the Moscow Document
"support vigorously, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in case of overthrow
or attempted overthrow" of a democracy "the legitimate organs of that State. .. ." Moscow
Document, supra note 32, at 1677.
234. PDD, supra note 113, at 803.

1995]

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO RESTORE DEMOCRACY

373

apply "even more rigorous factors ... when there is the possibility of
significant U.S. participation in Chapter VII operations that are likely
to involve combat .... "235
Resolution 940 established the precedent in the Haitian context
of a Chapter VII enforcement action involving use of force, if
necessary, to restore democracy. The Security Council
authorizes Member States to form a multinational force under
unified command and control and, in this framework, to use all
necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the
military leadership, consistent with the Governors Island Agreement, the prompt return of the legitimately elected President and
the restoration of the legitimate authorities of the Government of
Haiti, and to establish and maintain a secure and stable environment that will ]ermit implementation of the Governors Island
Agreement ....
This is the imposition of the harsher measure which, as noted by the
Security Council in the preamble of Resolution 940, Resolution 873
warned about. Under Resolution 873, the Council confirmed its
"readiness to consider... the imposition of additional measures..."
if the military authorities continued to impede the activities of the
U.N. Mission in Haiti or failed to comply in full with its relevant
resolutions and the provisions of the Governors Island Agreement0 37
The escalation of Security Council measures, prompted by the
continued obstruction of a resolution by the military junta, and the
authorization of use of force as a last resort imply that Resolution 940
is consistent with the principles of necessity and proportionality. In
fact, there was little force used by U.S. troops in Haiti throughout the
operation.28 Thus, the actual use of force to date has been necessary and proportional.

235. Id. at 804.
236. S.C. Res. 940, supra note 175.
237. S.C. Res. 873, supra note 169.
238. The major occurrence has been a confrontation between U.S. Marines and the Haitian
military police resulting in the death of ten Haitian police. Military Leaders Bury Their Dead
Troops, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Oct. 6, 1994, at 20.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
It is preferable that the Security Council be the international
body to assist for humanitarian purposes because of the potential for
abuse by individual states seeking political and territorial gain in the
guise of assistance. Alternatively, action by a regional organization
or group of states would be preferable to unilateral state action. In
the event that the Security Council cannot act, international law does
not require the rest of the world community to stand idly by as
atrocities and human rights abuses unfold. The legal right of the
international community to reach within a state to protect a population from massive human rights violations begins with Reisman's
concept of "popular sovereignty," described as "people's sovereignty
rather than the sovereign's sovereignty." 9 Since sovereignty is
derived from the will of the people and does not belong to the ruler
who holds power over the state, the ruler is included among those
Reisman, arriving
who can violate the sovereignty of the state.'
at the same conclusion as did P6rez de Cu6llar, asserts that sovereignty is no barrier to intervention to protect the population from human
rights abuses.241
The new concept of the right of humanitarian assistance supports
a right of unilateralhumanitarian assistance to halt egregious human
rights violations, at least when multilateral humanitarian assistance is
not forthcoming. The right of humanitarian assistance is based on the
right of victims to receive aid from those who are capable of
delivering it. This right belongs to member states of the world
community as well as the Security Council and exists independently
of Chapter VII obligations. Inspired by events in Bosnia, the World
Conference acknowledged a unilateral right of humanitarian assistance
when it called upon all countries to take measures, "individually and
collectively," against the practice of ethnic cleansing. 24 The request
demands, in effect, that the measures be prompt, appropriate, and
effective and include the use of force if necessary.243 Under the
present circumstances of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the
measures would have to include the use of force or the threat of force

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Reisman, supra note 7, at 869.
Id.at 867-70. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 15, at 71.
Reisman, supranote 7, at 872-873.
Vienna Declaration, supra note 34, at 1676.
See Vienna Declaration, supranote 34, at 1677.
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to be effective.2 The World Conference based the right of states
to take unilateral as well as collective action on the rights of the
victims, stating that the victims "are entitled to appropriate and
'
effective remedies."24
By acting under Chapter VII to address gross human rights
violations, the Security Council acknowledges that traditional concepts
of sovereignty, "matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction," 2' and non-intervention have changed, and that new concepts
govern intervention. Recent Security Council Chapter VII measures
confirm that "the principle of non-interference with the essential
domestic jurisdiction of States cannot be regarded as a protective
barrier behind which human rights could be massively or systematically violated with impunity."247 Security Council resolutions are bind-

ing' and, therefore, help establish the new concepts of the right of
humanitarian assistance and popular sovereignty as international law
principles.
Arguably, if the Security Council denominates a threat to peace
under Chapter VII, but then refrains from acting for lack of political
will or resources, some of the dangers of abuse of a subsequent
unilateral intervention are arguably diminished. In such a case, an
avowedly neutral, unbiased decision-maker would have made a
judgment that internal abuse and violations of human rights and
freedoms existed. Even though a diminished possibility of abuse
would remain, at least a bona fide purpose for assistance would have
been proven to exist.
Instances exist where a nation, which insists it will not act without
Security Council authority, nevertheless finds itself pushed by humanitarian imperatives to act. This may be claimed in the actions of the
French in Rwanda in July, 1994. The French pushed the Security
Council for authorization to allow French troops to set up a safe
haven in southwestern Rwanda to protect civilians from military

244. Some of the problems faced by U.N. peacekeepers in Bosnia include "the pattern of
hostilities by Bosnian Serb paramilitary units against towns and villages in eastern Bosnia...
the deliberate interdiction by Bosnian Serb paramilitary units of humanitarian assistance convoys
." and the Bosnian Serb paramilitary's "refusal to guarantee the safety and freedom of
movement of UNPROFOR personnel .... ." S.C. Res. 819, supra note 63.
245. Vienna Declaration, supra note 34, at 1676-77.
246. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, 7.
247. Pdrez de Cu6llar, supra note 1, at 7.
248. W. Michael Reisman, The ConstitutionalCrisis in the United Nations, 87 AM. J. INT'I

L. 83, 86 (1993).
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attack. 9 Ultimately, French troops were sent into southwestern
Rwanda prior to, though in contemplation of, U.N. authorization and,
arguably, at least initially, as a unilateral act."
Recent state practice supports a unilateral right of humanitarian
assistance. For example, over Iraq's protest alleging an "unfounded
attack on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq," the United
States, on April 16, 1991 gave notice that it would build, protect and
maintain refugee centers in the Zakho area for the Kurds in the north
in an enterprise involving ten thousand U.S. soldiers" 1 Theorists
argue that the United States and its coalition partners, France and
Great Britain, were not authorized by Resolution 6882 to intervene
to protect the Kurds in IraqY3 Without clear authority from the
Security Council, refugee "centers" or safety areas were established
on Iraq's territory without Iraq's consent by the United States,
France, and Great Britain. Furthermore, U.S. troops were initially
stationed on Iraqi soil without Iraq's consent to protect these centers
and the Zakho area of northern Iraq.'
To support the protected
area, the United States, Great Britain, and France established a ban
on all Iraqi military and civilian flights below the 32nd parallel, which
was enforced by surveillance missions preventing the Iraqi government from terrorizing the Shiites in southern Iraq. It is important
to note that these acts were justified by their humanitarian purpose
and that they were accomplished without Iraq's approval and, indeed,
were conducted over Iraq's objections z 6 These acts mark the
recognition of a unilateral right or obligation to assist by delivering
249. Raymond Bonner, FrenchEstablisha Base in Rwanda to Block Rebels, N.Y. TIMEs, July
5, 1994, at 1.
250. Id.
251. The Gulfi 5 million and counting, U.N. CHRON., Sept., 1991, at 47, 50. On April 18,
1991, Iraq signed a Memorandum of Understanding, by which Iraq agreed to: (1) "facilitate the
safe passage of emergency relief commodities throughout the country;" and (2) allow U.N.
humanitarian operations wherever through the establishment of U.N. sub-office Humanitarian
Centers. Id.
252. S.C. Res 688, supra note 62.
253. See KIRGIS, supra note 19, at 854-57.
254. 45 U.N.Y.B. 206, U.N. Sales No. E.92.I.1; KIRGIS, supranote 19, at 854-57.
255. William Clinton, Statement on Establishment of No-Fly Zone in Iraq, Aug. 26, 1992,
reprintedin President-ElectClinton's Foreign PolicyStatements December 12,1991-November 4,
1992, FOREION POL'Y BULL., NovJDec., 1992, at 2,18; Iraqioil revenues to be transferredto pay
for consequences of Kuwait invasion, U.N. CHRON., Dec., 1992, at 26, 30.
256. Ultimately, under an agreement with Iraq, U.S. troops were replaced by five hundred
lightly armed U.N. Guards. The purpose of the guards was to protect the humanitarian operation in all aspects: supplies, distribution centers, supply routes, and repatriation conveys. 45
U.N.Y.B. 206, U.N. Sales No. E.92.I.1; KIRGIs, supra note 18, at 856-57.

1995]

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO RESTORE DEMOCRACY

377

humanitarian aid in the form of protection of victims and the basics
of food, water, and shelter.
This emphasizes the point that sometimes circumstances require
unilateral action. One suspects that no matter where international
law stands, various nations will continue to come to the rescue of
those facing death, destruction, or deprivation, prompted by the
humanitarian impulse that is the essence of mankind and should be
the essence of mankind's institutions.

